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BISHNUPADA BHATTACHARYA

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FOREWORD

On March 17–19, 1985, Professor Bishnupada Bhattacharya delivered at the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, the *Professor K. V. Abhyankar Memorial Lectures* (Third Series) on "Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* and Linguistic Monism: A Philosophical Study" and "Linguistic Speculations in Sanskrit Poetics". His two lectures on the first theme are being published in this volume, which, though tiny in size, is, I believe, profound in contents.

Professor Bhattacharya, who has had the advantage of both traditional and modern training, served as Principal of the Government Sanskrit College, Calcutta, for a fairly long time, and is at present Research Professor in the Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, Calcutta. His main field of work may be said to be Sanskrit language and grammar – or, to put it more specifically, the *Nirukta* of Yāska. In his well-known book, *Yāska's Nirukta and the Science of Etymology* (Calcutta, 1958), Professor Bhattacharya has sought, among other things, to give a complete picture of the pre-Yāska stage of the etymological science and an account of the eminent etymologists who were the first originators of that branch of study. He has also ably discussed such problems as those relating to Yāska and Śākalya, Yāska's authorship of *Nighaṇṭu*, the recensions of the *Nirukta*, the lost treatise *Niruktavārttika*, the authors of the Nairukta school, and the different schools of Vedic interpretation. A mention needs to be made here also of Professor Bhattacharya's *A Study in Language and Meaning* (Calcutta, 1962) in which he has critically examined some aspects of Indian semantics. Incidentally I am here reminded of an interesting paper on "Tagore's aesthetics in the light of the Upaniṣads", which Professor Bhattacharya has recently contributed to the *Souvenir* of the 30th All India Oriental Conference (Santiniketan, 1980),

Therein he has shown how Tagore constantly uses Upaniṣadic terms and concepts, like *prakāśa*, *līlā*, *rasa*, etc., to elucidate his views on art and how he emphasizes that the aim of art is essentially spiritual perfection (*ātmasaṁskṛtir vāva śilpāni* – *Ait. Br.* 6. 27). We were, indeed, happy and thankful to have had a scholar of Professor Bhattacharya's stature as this year's " Abhyankar Lecturer ".

In the present lectures, Professor Bhattacharya has turned his searchlight on the philosophy of language. It is hoped that they will suitably supplement the lectures delivered by Professor K. A. Subramania Iyer, under this very lectureship and on more or less the same theme, five years ago.

Bhandarkar Oriental
Research Institute,
Poona
November 26, 1985

R. N. Dandekar

BHARTṚHARI'S VĀKYAPADĪYA AND LINGUISTIC MONISM (*ŚABDĀDVAITA-VĀDA*)

I

The *Vākyapadīya*, the *magnum opus* of the great Bhartṛhari, is not only the most authoritative text on the analytic aspect of Sanskrit language as such, but also one of the most important philosophical works dealing with some of the basic problems of linguistic philosophy, which has also engaged the attention of some of the most eminent linguistic philosophers of our age. The question of the relation of language with the external reality on the one hand and with the internal thought-process on the other is one of the fundamental problems of philosophy. We are aware that there have been various trends of metaphysical quest in India from the very earliest times, and they can be usually classed under two broad heads viz. dualism-pluralism and monism. The *Sāṃkhya-Yoga*, *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, and *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā* systems are examples of dualistic/pluralistic metaphysics, while the Vedānta of the school of Śaṅkara is the most outstanding example of monism. But besides Śaṅkara's *advaita*, which is usually known as *brahmādvaita*, there have been several other attempts at explaining the phenomenal universe of diversity from one absolute principle without any second. Several variants of monism, however, can be traced in the ancient philosophical literature of India, of which *śabdādvaita-vāda*, *vijñānādvaita-vāda*, and *sattādvaita-vāda* have been noticed in authoritative texts, besides the well-known *brahmādvaita-vada* or *ātmādvaita-vāda* as taught in the Upaniṣads according to the interpretation of the school with which Śaṅkara is affiliated. Bhartṛhari is the propounder of the theory of *śabdādvaita* or Linguistic Monism, which is a novel doctrine altogether, though the origin of the

doctrine is traceable in the Vedic Saṃhitās. Thus Bhartṛhari is a great exponent of Monism, though of a different sort, beside Śaṅkara. As the author of the commentary *Nayana-prasādinī* on *Citsukhī* observes:

brahmavit-prakāṇḍair Bhartṛharibhiḥ.

Bhartṛhari is, thus, a great Monist, a *brahma-vid*, and his *brahman* is of the nature of *śabda* or Logos.

II

Bhartṛhari in his *Vākyapadīya*, I. 8, clearly states that all the various metaphysical standpoints of the different philosophical systems can be traced ultimately to the *arthavāda-vākya*-s like '*asad vā idam agra āsīt*', '*āpo vā idam agra āsīt*', '*ubhau sakhāyau sayujau suparṇau / samānaṃ vṛkṣam pariṣasvajāte*' etc. in consonance with the respective outlook of the propounders of those systems. As it has been firmly declared in the *vṛtti* on the verse referred to above:

arthavādānarthavāda-prakārāṇi śrutivākyāni pauruṣeyāḥ pravādāḥ prāyeṇānupatanto dṛśyante / *

So the doctrine of *Śabdādvaita*, too, has its origin in the Vedas. That the doctrine of the origin of the universe from *śabda* or Logos, the ultimate and absolute creative principle, was well-known from a very early stage of philosophical speculation in India is also attested in the following aphorism of the *Brahma-sūtra* (I. 3. 28), where it has been referred to as a *prima facie* view for refutation - viz.:

śabda iti cen-nātaḥ prabhavāt pratyakṣānumānābhyām

That the universe originated from *śabda*, which is eternal and immutable, has been clearly stated in such Vedic texts as '*sa bhūr iti vyāharat sa bhūmim asṛjata*' (*Tait. Br.* II. 2. 4. 2), '*eta iti vai prajāpatir devān asṛjatāsṛgram iti manuṣyān*' etc. (*Bṛ. Up.*, I. 2. 4) and similar other texts like *Manu-saṃhitā* (I. 21).

which have been cited by Śaṅkara in his *Bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtra* referred to above as authorities on the point. In this context the following observations of a Western scholar would not seem, perhaps, out of the mark. Mario Piantelli, in the course of a critical study of Śaṅkara's treatment of *śabda-prabhavatva*, concludes with the statement :

> "......The features we have being (sic.) pointing out, namely the partial identity with Brahman — in terms of co-existence with /dependance from it - of *nityaśabda*, its articulation in terms of all-connecting *praṇava* and *veda*-s, its position in the manifestation of the universe as activity of the divine figure of Prajāpati, all together seem (even in Śaṅkara's treatment, along with other traditional elements of the orthodox world-picture inherited by the great *advaitın*, according to the special point of view of the *kevalādvaitavāda*) to constitute the original background of a doctrine of origination of the world of objectual manifoldness by a semantic quasi-archtype, which admitted of an ancient form of *sphoṭavāda* as one of the possible explanations of its ontological status. Bhartṛhari built his highly original linguistics and metaphysics on such a background, just as Śaṅkara, with a greater fidelity to the heritage of past ages, systematized it within the boundaries of his own *darśana*...... "[1]

III

It may be noted here that there are three hymns invoking Vāc ascribed to Dīrghatamas in the *Ṛgveda* - viz. 10. 71, 10. 125 and 1. 164, and in the *ṛk* I. 164. 46 Vāc is referred to as the *One Real* (*ekaṃ sat*). In the highly informative article entitled *The*

1. Comp. " Saṅkara réfuse ă la feis le *Sphoṭa* et un Brahman qui sérait parole " - Biardeau : *La philosophie de Maṇḍana Miśra vue á partir de la Brahmasiddhi*, p. 110 (Paris, 1969). The origin of the doctrine of *Śabda* as *Sphoṭa* and its identity with *Brahman* is very much obscure and it has been discussed by Dr. P. C. Chakravarti in his *The Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar*, Chap. IV, with great lucidity. *Vide loc. cit.*, pp. 85-86.

Creative Role of the Goddess Vāc in the Ṛgveda[2] the late Professor W. Norman Brown admirably analysed the various metaphysical concepts relating to Vāc and the means of realising her essence and observed *en passant*:

> "Thus the chain of creation is complete. Vāc produced the raw-material of the universe, the means for organising it, and taught the gods how to use that means. The capstone of the process was the provision that the instruction should be imparted to men so that they could constantly renew creation and thus perpetuate the existence of the universe."

Of course this esoteric conception of Vāc as traceable in the Ṛgvedic hymns is a good deal removed from the meta-physical conception of *śabda-brahman* as interpreted by Bhartṛhari and his followers, though the author of the *Mahābhāṣya* alludes to several *mantra*-s of the Ṛgveda itself where they are interpreted as representing *śabda* or speech as *maho devaḥ*, the Supreme God, residing in the mortals, from the standpoint of the Philosophy of Grammar. Still, inspite of this long evolutionary background Bhartṛhari's contribution to the concept of speech as the only absolute principle forming the very basis of this phenomenal universe is unique by virtue of its metaphysical subtlety and sublimity. With a view to establishing his philosophical tenet relating to *śabda* as *Brahman*, Bhartṛhari posits three stages in the evolution of *śabda* from the *paśyantī*, through *madhyamā*, the intermediate, ending in *vaikharī*, the audible crude stage, with which we laymen are directly concerned. The grammatical systems including that of Pāṇini, which are busy with the analysis of spoken words, justly attach the greatest importance to the *vaikharī* form of speech. And some scholars are of opinion that the three *kāṇḍa*-s of Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* relate themselves respectively to the three gradually evolving stages of *Vāk* – viz. *paśyantī*, *madhyamā* and *vaikharī*, in consonance with his meta-

2. In *Pratidānam / Indian, Iranian and Indo-European Studies / Presented to Franciscus Bernardus Jacobus Kuiper On His Sixtieth Birthday /* Mouton : The Hague : 1968 : pp. 393–397.

physical outlook. I would like, in this connection, to quote the observations of the late Professor K. A. S. Iyer, bearing on this issue, which will not be out of place in this context:

" Is it an accident that, just as *Vāk* has three stages, so has *Vākyapadīya* which is, after all, a treatise on *Vāk*, three *Kāṇḍas*? Would it be seeing too much in Bhartṛhari to say that he intended *Paśyantī* to be the chief subject-matter of the first *Kāṇḍa*, *Madhyamā* that of the second *Kāṇḍa* and *Vaikharī* that of the third *Kāṇḍa*? The first chapter is called *Brahmakāṇḍa*. Brahman is the undifferentiated ultimate reality to which *Paśyantī* is very near. The indivisible sentence and sentence-meaning form the main subject-matter of the second *Kāṇḍa*. Thus differentiation into word and meaning has taken place, but each is still a unity. There is some differentiation, but the unity is also preserved. Would it be mere fancy, to see in it a correspondence to the *Madhyamā* stage? We saw in the third *Kāṇḍa*, we are entirely in the realm of analysis and differentiation which is just the characteristic of the *Vaikharī*. That all is not pure imagination and that Bhartṛhari might have meant his three *Kāṇḍas* to be representative of the three stages of *Vāk* is confirmed by one of the concluding stanzas of Helārāja's commentary on the third *Kāṇḍa*. In it, he definitely looks upon the third *Kāṇḍa* as the *Vaikharī*. He prays that this stage of *Vāk*, the *Vaikharī*, should become well-established among all men through his commentary. We do not have his commentary on the first two *Kāṇḍas*. So we cannot say whether he identified them with the *Paśyantī* and *Madhyamā* or not.

" Whether Bhartṛhari intended to emphasise one stage of *Vāk* in each *Kāṇḍa* or not it is remarkable that he is ever conscious, right through the *Vākyapadīya* of the *Brahman-Śabdatattva* out of which the whole phenomenal world

emanates. It runs like a thread through the work and gives it a kind of unity."[3]

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3. Prof. K. A. Subrahmania Iyer: *Sanskrit and the Philosophy of Language* in *Proceedings of the First International Sanskrit Conference*, Vol. II, Part II, pp. 77–78 (Ed. Prof. V. Raghavan / Ministry of Education and Social Welfare / Govt. of India / New Delhi / India / 1976). The verse of Helārāja, referred to above in the course of this quotation, is:

nirākāṅkṣeṇa vapuṣā gatā viśva-janīnatām /
tṛtīyā vāg-avastheyaṃ pratiṣṭhām upayātyitaḥ //

– occurring at the end of his commentary *Prakīrṇa-prakāśa* on the *Pada-kāṇḍa* of the *Vākyapadīya*. It may also be pointed out in this connection that Abhinavagupta at the end of the commentary *Locana* on each of the four *Uddyotas* of *Dhvanyāloka* similarly invokes the four different manifestations of *Vāk* according to their order of evolution.

In this context, a reference might be made to the problem of three-fold division of *Vāk* as found in Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya vis-à-vis* the four-fold one by the addition of *parā* as the highest stage as found in the works of Nāgeśa. We cite below the cogent observations of late Dr. K. C. Pandey, which might be of interest to serious students of the history of development of philosophical speculations in India:

"Somānanda was a younger contemporary of Vasugupta. He made a definitely rationalistic approach to the problem of Ultimate Reality. He distinctly refers to various schools of thought and rationally proves the unsoundness of their theories. His attacks are directed primarily against *Śabda-brahma-vāda* of the grammarians and the *śaktyadvaya-vāda* of a section of Kāśmīra Śaivas. He refuted the theory propounded by Bhartṛhari (A. D. 650) in his *Vākyapadīyam*, that *paśyantī* is the Ultimate, *parā*. He established *parā* to be distinct from *paśyantī*.

"The earlier grammarians accepted only one stage of transition. The *madhyamā*, from the subtlest speech (*paśyantī*) to the grossest (*vaikharī*). In Kaiyaṭa's *Pradīpa*, we find a different interpretation of these Vedic passages (*catvāri śṛṅgā* etc.) which are interpreted by Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa, in his *Uddyota*, as implying *parā*. Recognition of *parā*, as distinct from *paśyantī*, by Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa and his followers, was due to the influence of the *Śaiva-Āgamas*. Thus, the contribution of Somānanda to the philosophy of Grammar is the establishment of *parā* as distinct from and higher than *paśyantī*. The *parā* is recognised by the Śaivas as identical with what they call *avatantra* or *vimarśa*." – K. C. Pandey: *History of Philosophy : Eastern and Western*, Vol. I, p. 382. Also: "I may take liberty to suggest here that philosophy of grammar, built upon the basis of Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* by the great savant Bhartṛhari, was affiliated to the Āgama Literature akin to Saiva and

(*Continued on next page*)

IV

Now Bhartṛhari, in keeping with his monistic outlook, identifies the phenomenal universe in all its diversity with the ultimate principle – which according to him is *Vāk* as *Paśyantī*. At that stage there is no difference between *Word* and *Meaning* – *śabda* and *artha*. As he says:

ekasyaivātmano bhedau śabdārthāv apṛthaksthitau[4]

Just as in the yolk within the peacock's egg the diverse forms and colours of the plumes are present in an undifferentiated state, similarly within the womb of *Paśyantī* the phenomenal universe with all its endless varieties of colour, taste, form and smell, touch and sound is dormant in an undifferentiated state in complete identity with *Vāk* – the creative principle. Gradually in the course of evolution *Vāk* loses its pristine purity and subtlety manifesting itself as *madhyamā* and *vaikharī*, which last alone is looked upon as speech proper by laymen, uninitiated into the true essence of *Vāk*, and constitutes the medium of our day-to-day communication. *Vāk* as *paśyantī* is beyond the comprehension of ordinary worldly beings labouring under the spell of nescience (*avidyā*) that presents unity as diversity, one as many, and hypostatises our inner states of cognition as meanings (*artha*) with an intrinsic and independent existence of their own in the world outside and as such real, without being affected by any verbal or non-verbal element. Thus *avidyā* plays a vital role in

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(Continued from previous page)

Sākta āgamas of Kashmir." – Mm. Pt. Gopinath Kaviraj. Regarding the threefold level of *vāk* as recognised by Bhartṛhari and the possible recognition of *parā vāk* at the highest level Harold G. Coward's *Bhartṛhari*, Chapter 2, Section IV ('*Levels of Language in the* Vākyapadīya ') might be consulted (Twayne Publishers U. S. A. 1976) in Twayne's World Author Series.

4. Cf. " To the Grammarian the thought is the same as the object, with this difference that the former is an internal, while the latter is only an external aspect of one and the same Reality." – Mm. Pt. Gopinath Kaviraj. Thought in its abstract aspect is Universal in itself while as concrete it is Universal as manifested in the Individual.

the metaphysical conception of the grammarians of the school of Bhartṛhari, a role similar to that ascribed to it by Vedāntins of the school of Śaṅkara. Bhartṛhari, in his auto-commentary on *Vākyapadīya* I. i – viz. :

> *anādinidhanaṃ brahma śabdatattvaṃ yad akṣaram* /
> *vivartate 'rthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ* //

quotes the following two *kārikā-s* from some unknown source with the prefatory remark : '*tathā hy uktam*', that have an ineffable Vedāntic tinge in them – viz. :

> *yathā viśuddham ākāśaṃ timiropapluto janaḥ* /
> *saṃkīrṇam iva mātrābhiś citrābhir abhimanyate* //
> *tathedam amṛtam brahma nirvikāram avidyayā* /
> *kaluṣatvam ivāpannaṃ bhedarūpaṃ vivartate* // [5]

Here the occurrence of the term *avidyā* in close conjunction with *vivartate* is significant. In several other places also Bhartṛhari has made use of the term *avidyā*, while referring to the principle of differentiation and diversification of the world of meanings from the absolute, unitary and undifferentiated *Vāk*, constituting the very basis of the analytic procedure adopted by the Science of

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5. Cf. "The following two verses in the *svopajña-ṭīkā* of Bhartṛhari on *Vā Pa* I. 1 : "*yathā.. vivartate*" have been paraphrased by Diṅnāga in his *Traikālya-parīkṣā* (verses 31–320 " which is available only in Tibetan translation and not in Sanskrit. It is interesting to note that Diṅnāga has paraphrased Bhartṛhari's verses. It is closely to be examined.... It is likely that *śabda-brahma-vāda* of Bhartṛhari is not of his own innovation" according to N. A. Shastri, the great Buddhist scholar of Viśva-Bhāratī, Santiniketan." – *Vākyapadīya of Śrī Bhartṛhari* : Ed. by Prof. K. A. V. Abhyankar and Acarya V. P. Limaye, Second Suppliment to Appendix III, p. 352 (University of Poona, Sanskrit and Prakrit Series, Poona, 1965). In this connection it may be noted that *śabda-brahma-vāda* was also accepted by Maṇḍana Miśra, who in his *vṛtti* on *Brahma-siddhi*, I. 1, hints at this doctrine. Cf.

> *brahmaṇaḥ śabdātmakatvaṃ na kevalaṃ bhagavato Bhartṛharer eva sammatam iti bhramitavyam* / *ācārya-Maṇḍana-Miśra caraṇair api svapraṇīta-brahmasiddhi-granthe brahmakāṇḍastha-prathamapadyā ntargatasyākṣarapadasya vyākhyāvasare brahmaṇaḥ śabdātmatā pratipāditā – 'akṣaraṃ iti śabdātmatām āhe' – tyādi-granthena* /

– Mm. Pt. Harancandra Sāstrī in his *Kāla-siddhānta-darśinī*, p. 25, f. n.

Grammar (*vyākaraṇāgama*) for a description of the nature of speech in its *Vaikharī* form as made use of for the purpose of our self-expression and mutual communication. As he states : (VP. II. 233. + III. 14. 78) :

śāstreṣu prakriyā-bhedair avidyaivopavarṇyate |
*anāgama-vikalpā tu svayaṃ vidyopavarṇyate |**

Here *Vyākaraṇa* as *śāstra* is announced emphatically as being related to *avidyā*, though ultimately it leads to *vidyā* or true knowledge leading to comprehension of *Vāk* as *paśyantī*. Similarly in the section *Kāla-samuddeśa* both these terms *vidyā* and *avidyā* are found to be used in mutual opposition in the following *kārikā* :

śaktyātma-devatā-pakṣair bhinnaṃ kālasya darśanam |
prathamaṃ tad avidyāyām yad vidyāyām na vidyate ||

Not only common people alone working under nescience fail to comprehend the true essence of things, not to speak of *Vāk* as the ultimate creative principle, while employing *Vaikharī* as the medium of their communication, even seers, who have a glimpse of the essence of Reality as such, must *ipso facto* have to come down to the level of common people while expressing themselves through articulate speech in the act of communication, because communication is impossible in the stage of direct apprehension of Reality, where there is no trace of differentiation of any sort, which is, however, the very basis of all communicative acts in the mundane level. This has been emphasised again and again in more than one place of the *Vākyapadīya*. In the following *kārikā* of the *Sambandha-samuddeśa* section the doctrine of the *trayyanta-vedins*, the doctors who are the masters of the teachings of the Upaniṣads or the Vedānta, has been unambiguously stated : (VP. III. 3. 72) :

yatra draṣṭā ca dṛśyaṃ ca darśanaṃ vāvikalpitam |
*tasyaivārthasya satyatvaṃ śritās trayyanta-vedinaḥ ||**

So also in the fourth *kārikā* of *Brahma-kāṇḍa*, the three-fold differentiation of the Absolute into *bhoktṛ*, *bhoktavya* and *bhoga*

has been declared as the product of nescience that has its validity only in the plane of our mundane existence viz. :

ekasya sarva-bījasya yasya ceyam anekadhā /
bhoktṛ-bhoktavya-rūpeṇa bhogarūpeṇa ca sthitiḥ //

Thus in the stage of our worldly existence, in the *vyavahāradaśā*, the seer, who has realised the essential Being, is on the same level with the common run of people, labouring under nescience, as both have to make use of *śabda* as *Vaikharī*, where difference between the verbal element and the meaning expressed by it is taken for granted, which is nothing but *vikalpa*. As Bhartṛhari emphatically declares : (VP. II. 130)

ṛṣīṇāṃ darśanaṃ yac ca tattve kiñcid avasthitam /
na tena vyavahāro 'sti na tac chabdanibandhanam //

Similarly :

rūpaṇa-vyapadeśābhyāṃ laukike vartmani sthitau /
*jñānaṃ pratyabhilāpaṃ ca sadṛśau bāla-paṇḍitau //**
(VP. III. 3. 55)

Saṅkara seems to echo the statements of Bhartṛhari in his oft-quoted saying occurring in his *Śārīraka-bhāṣya* on the very first aphorism of the *Brahma-sūtra* – viz. :

tasmād avidyāvad-viṣayāṇy eva pratyakṣādīni
pramāṇāni śāstrāṇi ca / paśvādibhiś cāviśeṣāt //

In his *Bhāṣya* on the *Gītā*, XIII. 2 Śaṅkara similarly observes :

bandhāvasthāyām eva śāstrādy-arthavattvam,
na muktāvasthāyām //

V

But it might be asked : If Absolute Reality is one without a second, and if the diversity, sequence, appearance and disappearance as experienced in the phenomenal universe is but a shadow having its genesis in the cosmic nescience that obstructs

our vision, how does Brahman *qua* Word in the system of Bhartṛhari manifest itself as many even though One, as occurring in sequence even though by Itself beyond all sequence and ever-existent, as arranged in time and space even though Itself non-temporal and non-spatial in character, as subject and object, as cogniser and the thing cognised, as the expressive word and the meaning expressed thereby and similar other hypostatizations, even though by itself It is indivisible ? The question is a fundamental one that confronts every monistic conception of metaphysics in some form or other. The Vedānta as interpreted by Saṅkara has sought the help of *māyā* for explanation of plurality and other appearances in the world of phenomena. Bhartṛhari has tried to explain it by having recourse to the concept of *śakti* or power inherent in *śabda-brahman*. In the very second *kārikā* of *Vākyapadīya*, *Brahma-kāṇḍa*, which is also called *Āgama-samuccaya*, Bhartṛhari declares in an unambiguous way :

> *ekam eva yad āmnātaṃ bhinnam śakti-vyapāśrayāt |*
> *apṛthaktve 'pi śaktibhyaḥ pṛthaktvena ca vartate ||* [6]

Thus, though *śabda-brahman* is One without a second, It manifests Itself as distinct and manifold, having an independent status as it were, through the working of various powers or potencies inherent in Itself. These potencies are of diverse sorts, some of which are direct and others indirect, and though they are identical with *śabda-brahman*, they seem to be different from It. In truth, *śabda-brahman* is a totality of potencies which have no separate independent being of their own apart from their

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6. Compare : " *śabdeṣv evāśritā śaktir viśvasyāsya nibandhanī |*
yan-netraḥ pratibhātmāyaṃ bhedarūpaḥ pratīyate ||
– *Vākyapadīya*, I. 118. " Bhartṛhari has used the word *śakti* (power) altogether 109 times in his work in different contexts. According to the Vaiśeṣika system of philosophy, time, space, direction, *Samavāya* (inherence), action etc. are substances and different categories (*padārtha*). But Hari calls them all powers. For him the entire universe is bundle of powers. The Brahman (neut.), according to him, possesses unlimited powers and as a matter of fact the Brahman (neut.) is not different from the powers. . . . " – S. S. Peri, *loc. cit.*, p. 75.

substratum which is One, Indivisible and Eternal. As Bhartṛhari states in another context in the second *kārikā* of the *Sādhana-samuddeśa* section of the third *Kāṇḍa* of the *Vākyapadiya*:

śaktimātrā-samūhasya viśvasyānekadharmaṇaḥ |
sarvadā sarvathā bhāvāt kvacit kiñcid vivakṣyate || *

In Bhartṛhari's system *dik* (direction), *kāla* (time), *ākāśa* (space), *kriyā* (action), *abhyanujñā* (permission), *pratibandha* (suspension), *atīta* (past), *vartamāna* (present), *bhaviṣyat* (future), *samavāya* (inherence), *sādhana* (instrument) and similar other potencies of *śabda-brahman*, the Ultimate Word-Principle, have been recognised with a view to explaining the workings of the world of appearance in which we live and move and have our being.[7] Of these potencies *Kāla-śakti*[8] of *śabda-*

7. Cf. "Bhartṛhari has mentioned names of some of the main powers of the Brahman (neut.): time, space, direction, action, inherent instrument, sequence, permission, suspension, decomposition, present, past, future, etc. All these powers can be divided into categories: (1) The direct powers of the Brahman (neut.) and (2) the indirect powers of Brahman (neut.). Time, space, direction, action, generally come under direct powers. Inherence, instrument, sequence, permission, suspension, decomposition, present, past, future, etc. come under indirect powers." – Sarveswara Sharma Peri: *The Idea of Power (Śakti) in the Vākyapadīya* in *Bhāratīya Vidyā*, Vol. XLI, pp. 75–79, Nos. 1–2.

8. The non-difference of *śakti* and *śaktimat* advanced by the teachers of the Pratyabhijñā School of Kashmir may be noted here. Compare:

śaktiś ca śaktimad-rūpād vyatirekam na vāñchati |
tādātmyam anayor nityaṃ vahni·dāhikayor iva ||

– Abhinavagupta's *Bodha-pañcāśikā* v. 3. In the Sixth Section of the Third *Kāṇḍa* of *Vākyapadīya* Bhartṛhari has elaborately discussed the issue of difference and non-difference or identity between *śakti* and *śaktimat* in the following *kārikā*-s, where it has been clearly laid down that the discussion is futile from the absolute standpoint. Cf.:

ekatvam āsām śaktīnāṃ nānātvaṃ veti kalpane |
avastu-patite jñātvā satyato na parāmṛśet ||

....

naikatvam asty anānātvam vinaikatvena netarat ||
paramārthe tayor eṣa bhedo 'tyantaṃ na vidyate ||

(*Continued on the next page*)

brahman has been recognised as the basic power, the *primus inter pares*, which is also designated by the term *svātantrya* and is endowed with the capacities of *pratibandha* and *abhyanujñā*, through the operation of which the origin, duration and disappearance of objects in the world are controlled and determined. Bhartṛhari, in the *Kāla-samuddeśa* section of the *Vākyapadīya*, calls time (*kāla*) as the *sūtra-dhāra*, the operator and string-holder, of this universe conceived as a unique machine (*loka-yantra*), which is at the root of its creation and destruction :

tam asya loka-yantrasya sūtra-dhāraṃ pracakṣate /
pratibandhābhyanujñābhyāṃ tena viśvaṃ vibhajyate //
yadi na pratibadhnīyat pratibandhaṃ ca notsṛjet /
*avasthā vyatikīryeran paurvāparyavinākṛtāḥ //**

The six-fold modes of action as conceived by Vārṣyāyaṇi -viz. *janman, sattā, vipariṇāma, vṛddhi, apakṣaya* and *vināśa*, are but evolutes and manifestations of this basic and independent *kāla-śakti* inherent in *śabda-brahman*.* Bhartṛhari has even equated *Kāla* with the all-pervading (*vibhu*) and omnipotent (*svatantra*) Brahman, which is *Śabda-tattva* Itself according to his metaphysical view-point, as is clear from the following *kārikā* of the *Kāla-samuddeśa* : (*VP*. III. 9. 14) :

jala-yantra-bhramāveśa-sadṛśībhiḥ pravṛttibhiḥ /
sa kalāḥ kālayan sarvāḥ kālākhyāṃ labhate vibhuḥ //[9]

(*Continued from the last page*)

na śaktīnāṃ tathā bhede yathā śaktimatāṃ sthitiḥ /
na ca laukikam ekatvam tāsām ātmasu vidyate //
– *Vākyapadīya*, III. 6. 24–27.

Helārāja observes :

tathā śaktīnāṃ kārya-nānātvenonnīyamāna-bhedānāṃ
svata ādhārāccābhede' stītyanirvācyā eva bhedābhedābhyāṃ
sarvāḥ śaktayaḥ / ata evāvidyāśaktir brahmaṇe bhedam
na vidhatta // yena dvaitāpattiḥ Prakīrṇa-prakāśa
on III. 6. 27.

See also *Vākyapadīya*, III. 7. 38–39.

9. Compare : *avyāhatāḥ kalā yasya kālaśaktim upāśritāḥ /*
janmādaye vikārāḥ ṣaḍ bhāva-bhedasya yonayaḥ //
– *Vākyapadīya*, I. 3.

But, even so, Bhartṛhari looks upon the operation of *kāla-śakti* as valid only in the state of nescience (*avidyā*) which disappears when true realisation of the Ultimate Reality viz. *śabda-brahman*, shines forth in all its pristine glory. As he states:

śaktyātma-devatā-pakṣair bhinnaṃ kālasya darśanam |
prathamaṃ tad avidyāyāṃ yad vidyāyāṃ na vidyate ||[10]
(*VP*. III. 9. 62)

Thus, the reality of the phenomenal world, brought into being through the operation of the *kāla-śakti* and other derivatives thereof, is only appearance from the view-point of the Absolute

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10. Cf.: " According to Bhartṛhari, time is a creative power. As long as *avidyā* continues, time and its powers – *pratibandha*, *abhyanujñā*, *krama*, *jarā*, *bhūta*, *bhaviṣyat*, *vartamāna*, etc. – all are real in the empirical world. They are not super-impositions. When true knowledge, i.e. *vidyā*, is attained, the entire universe is recognised as mere illusion and thus time, which is the first creation of illusion, disappears together with the entire universe (*kārikās* 62 and 67)." – Peri Sarveswara Sharma: *The Kāla-samuddeśa of Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya*, Introduction, p. 32 (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, First Edition, 1972). The following observations of Shri S. S. Peri may be noted in this connection: "....Bhartṛhari repeatedly states that time controls the entire universe through its two powers 'suspension' and 'permission.' This is his novel conception. He exemplifies it, as we have seen, in *kārikās* 4–5, 15, 30, 42–44, and 70, and shows that the sequence we notice in the states of all things is also caused by the said two powers.

" Besides, time possesses three other energies – past, future, and present – through which things appear and disappear (see *kārikā* 44). But these three can, as a matter of fact, be reduced to two 'opening' (*unmīlana*) and 'closing' (*nimīlana*) –'present' representing *unmīlana*, and 'past' as well as 'future' representing *nimīlana*. Again, *unmīlana* and *nimīlana* are nothing but *abhyanujñā* and *pratibandha*, respectively." – *Op. cit.*, Intro., pp. 30–31.

It may be pointed out here in this connection that Abhinavagupta, the great philosopher of the Śaiva-Pratyabhijñā school of Kashmir, makes use of the expression *unmīlana-śakti* with reference to *pratibhā* in the concluding verse of his commentary *Locana* on the *First Uddyota* of the *Dhvanyāloka*, which reminds us of Bhartṛhari's use of *unmīlana* with reference to *Kāla-śakti*. Cf.:

yad-unmīlana-śaktyaiva viśvam unmīlati kṣaṇāt |
svātmāyatana-viśrāntāṃ tām vande pratibhāṃ śivām ||

– viz. *śabdatattva*, which can be realised when the transcendental vision (*vidyā*) bursts forth driving away the veil of nescience that limits our capacity to dive into the very core of things.

VI

Now, there arises the question as regards the relation between *śabda-brahman* or Supreme Reality on the one hand and the phenomenal universe of *nāma-rūpa* on the other. It may be noted in this connection that Bhartṛhari in his *vṛtti* on *Vākyapadīya*, I. 12 :

prāptarūpa-vibhāgāyā yo vācaḥ paramo rasaḥ |
yat tat puṇyatamaṃ jyotis tasya mārgo 'yam āñjasaḥ ||

cites a verse in corroboration of his doctrine of identity of *śabda* and *artha*, which runs as follows and in which the Vedāntic terminology — *nāman* and *rūpa* has been distinctly made use of :

nāmaivedaṃ rūpatvena vavṛte
rūpam cedaṃ nāma-mātre 'vatasthe |
eke tad ekam avibhaktaṃ vibhejuḥ
prāg evānye bhedarūpaṃ vadanti ||

Just as in the Advaita Vedānta there is the fundamental problem relating to the relation between *Brahman* and the Universe and according to difference of viewpoints the doctrines of *utpatti-vāda*, *pariṇāma-vāda*, *vivarta-vāda* have been propounded, similarly the self-same view-points are possible in the context of the origin of the universe spread before us from *śabda-brahman*. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, while refuting the doctrine of *śabdādvaita-vāda* ascribed to Bhartṛhari, examines its validity from the various standpoints of *śabdādhyāsa-vāda*, *śabda-pariṇāma-vāda*, and *śabda-vivarta-vāda*. Bhartṛhari in his *Vākyapadīya* employs the term *pariṇāma* as also *vivarta* (along with its cognate variants – viz. *vivartate*, *vivṛtta* etc.) that might give rise to ambiguity regarding his explanation of the relation subsisting between *śabda-brahman* and the manifested universe in the shape of audible words

(*nāman*) and the objects or meanings (*rūpa/artha*). For example, in the *Kārikā*, I. 120 – viz. :

> *śabdasya pariṇāmo 'yam ity āmnāyavido viduḥ /*
> *chandobhya eva prathamam etad viśvaṃ vyavartata //*

– the terms *pariṇāma* and *vivarta* as implied in the expression *vyavartata* have been employed more or less indiscriminately.[11] So there is ample scope for clarification of the exact significance of these two terms, also traceable in the Vedāntic tradition, and perhaps, due to this ambiguity the opponents of the *śabdādvaita-vāda* like Jayanta Bhaṭṭa have endeavoured to demonstrate the non-validity of Bhartṛhari's doctrine from the viewpoint both of *pariṇāma* and *vivarta* as used in their technical sense in the classical philosophical systems of Sāṃkhya and *Advaita-Vedānta*. The same problem as to the validity of *ārambha-vāda, pariṇāma-vāda* and *vivarta-vāda* with reference to causality in the context of the phenomenal world, for example in the case of production of a jar (*ghaṭa*) from a lump of clay (*mṛt-piṇḍa*), has to be faced and it has been resolved from different viewpoints by the upholders of *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, Sāṃkhya and *Advaita* metaphysics in consonance with their respective philosophical outlook.

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11. Bhartṛhari has used the term *vivartate* and its other cognates very frequently with a view to explaining the origin of the universe (*viśva*) in the form of *nāma-rūpa* from *śabda*. Cf. *Vākyapadīya*, I. 1, I. 112, 114 (*vyvartata*), I. 117 (*vivartamāna*), I. 146 (*vivṛttānām*), etc. The following remarks of Allen Wright Thrasher of Chicago in his article entitled *Vivarta According to Maṇḍana Miśra* in *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens und Archiv für Indische Philosophie*, Band XXV, 1981 would be deemed pertinent on this issue :

> " To the objection that VPy usually seems to identify *vivarta* and *pariṇāma*, the reply may be given that it is not stating its own opinion here but giving that of others. Besides, the VPy in at least one other place appears to deny modification of Brahman. Commenting on V. P. I. 1. it quotes this verse (14. 1–2) : *tathedam amṛtaṃ brahma....//* ...*vikāra* is used instead of its synonym *pariṇāma*. It appears that it is distinguished from *vivarta*, even though elsewhere it is used where we would expect *vivarta*. But it is hard to pin the author of the VPy down. As M. Biardeau justly says, he continually shows a " syncrétisme invertébré," " – *loc. cit.*, p. 229.

The problem of production of the effect from the cause has been explained by Śaṅkara and his followers as *vivarta*, an illusory appearance without any objective reality, where the cause appears as effect, the effect being just a super-imposition (*adhyāsa*), having no objectivity of its own apart from the cause which alone is real. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of *ārambha-vāda* and the Sāṁkhya theory of *pariṇāma-vāda* are but stepping stones leading gradually to the doctrine of *vivarta-vāda* of the Advaitins, which is the only true and satisfactory explanation of the problem of causality. This also seems to be the standpoint of Bhartṛhari, who being a Monist, cannot afford to admit the objective reality of the phenomenal creation independently of *śabda-tattva*, which alone is real in his system. It has also to be noted that Bhartṛhari like the Advaitins of Śaṅkara's system frequently makes use of the imageries of *alāta-cakra*,[12]

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12. For *alāta-cakra* see *Vākyapadīya*, III. 8. 8, II. 291. The question of production of effect from the cause, e. g. in *bījād aṅkuro jāyate*, has been looked upon from the viewpoints of *ārambha*, *pariṇāma* and *vivarta* in *Vākyapadīya*, III. 7. 105–107, where Bhartṛhari refers to his own theory of identity of the effect with its cause, as interpreted by Helārāja. Cf.

> *yuktaṃ caitad yad uta kāraṇam eva kārya-bhāvenāvatiṣṭhata iti svasiddhāntam upapādayitum āha – yathāheḥ kuṇḍalībhāvo vyagrāṇāṃ ca samagratā | tathaiva janmarūpatvaṃ satām ekaṃ pracakṣate ||*

– Helārāja's *Prakīrṇa-prakāśa* on *Vākyapadīya*, III. 7. 107. Helārāja points out unambiguously that the term *vikāra* in the expression *bhāva-vikāra* stands for *vivarta* and not *pariṇāma* in his commentary on *Vākyapadīya*, III. 1. 36 :

> *sarvabhāva-vikāreṣu ṣaḍavasthāḥ prapadyate | kramena śaktibhiḥ svābhinavaṃ pratyavabhāsate ||* – in the following extract :
>
> ....*na ca pariṇati-darśanābhiprāyeṇāyaṃ vikāra-śabdaḥ | anitya-tva-prasaṅgāt | api tu vivarta-paryāyo'yam | tathā hi – sarva-śaktyātma-bhūtatvād brahmaṇo'neka-vikāra-pradarśana-sāmarthya-lakṣaṇā avidyātmā śaktiḥ kārya-bhedād upacaritanānātvā samastī-tyāgamavidaḥ | itthaṃ ca svābhir eva śaktibhir avyatiriktābhir janmādirūpatayā avidyāyām ābhāsate | tad eva sarvabhāveṣu samāna-rūpaṃ sattātmakam anyasya tad-vyatiriktasyābhāvād ity eṣo 'trārthaḥ |*

Similarly, in his commentary on *Vākyapadīya*, III. 2. 15 : viz. *vikārāpa-game satyam*.... etc. Helārāja clearly states :

(*Continued on next page*)

gandharva-nagara, maru-marīcikā, svapna-gaja, rajju-sarpa, śukti-rajata etc. to illustrate the unreality of the phenomenal creation. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, in his *Nyāya-mañjarī*, has examined the concept of *vivarta* from the standpoints of *ārambha, pariṇāma* and *avabhāsa* and has tried to bring out its utter improbability as an argument towards establishing the soundness of the doctrine of *śabda-tattva* as the sole reality.

VII

Now, according to Śaṅkara's *Advaita* every phenomenal entity, though false as an appearance, has yet a core of reality, hidden under its outward sheath, which consists of *nāma-rūpa*. As it has been stated in Vidyāraṇya's *Pañcadaśī* :

asti bhāti priyaṃ rūpam nāma cety aṃśa-pañcakam /
ādyam trayam brahma-rūpam jagad-rūpam ato dvayam //

Thus, existence (*sattā*), illumination, which is but another name of consciousness (*caitanya*) and bliss (*ānanda*) are inherent and innermost constituents of every entity in the phenomenal universe, whereas name (*nāma*) and form (*rūpa*) are but outward appearances only. The first three constitute the essential nature of *brahman* and as such real (*satya*), whereas the remaining two are variable and illusory, and as such false (*mithyā* or *anṛta*). Every phenomenal being is thus made up of these two parts - the one true and real, and the other false and unreal. As Śaṅkara declares in his *Śārīraka-Bhāṣya* :

satyānṛte mithunīkṛtya naisargiko'yaṃ loka-vyavahāraḥ /

(*Continued from previous page*)

tasya cid-rūpasya cicchaktir apariṇāminīti vikārābhāvān nedaṃ Sāṃkhya-nayavat pariṇāma-darśanam, api tu vivarta-pakṣaḥ / viśeṣaś cānayor Vākyapadīye'smābhir vyākhyāta iti tata evāvadhāryam / ihāpi Sambandha-samuddeśe vakṣyate / kāraṇāntara-vyudāsaś cādvaya-siddhāv abhihita iti saty arthitve tata evāvāgantavyaḥ /

Bhartṛhari's approach on this issue is also essentially the same. For he also looks upon phenomenal creation as made up of two aspects – one real and the other unreal. The essence of the real aspect is pure Being (*sattā*), which is manifested as *jāti* (Universal) in all particulars (*vyakti*). It is *jāti* in the form of *sattā* that is the noumenon, while the *vyakti*-s are mere appearances, having varying names and forms. That *sattā* is inherent in the connotation of every *prātipadika* and every *dhātu* and it is the great *Ātman* or Self that permeates the entire universe. As Bhartṛhari declares in the First Section (*Jāti-samudeśa*) of the *Prakīrṇa-kāṇḍa* of his *Vākyapadīya* (III. 1. 32–34) :

satyāsatyau tu yau bhāgau pratibhāvaṃ vyavasthitau /
satyaṃ yat tatra sā jātir asatyā vyaktayaḥ smṛtāḥ //
sambandhibhedāt sattaiva bhidyamānā gavādiṣu /
jātir ity ucyate tasyāṃ sarve śabdā vyavasthitāḥ //
tāṃ prātipadikārthaṃ ca dhātvarthaṃ ca pracakṣate /
sā nityā sā mahān ātmā tām āhus tva-talādayaḥ // [13]

As in Bhartṛhari's system meanings (*artha*) are nothing but evolutes of *śabda-brahman*, which is but another name of *Sphoṭa*, and as *Sphoṭa* is both pure Being and pure Consciousness, it is but quite natural that the meanings, too, would partake of these attributes of the Ultimate Reality. Bhartṛhari says that of the three illuminations (*jyotiḥ/prakāśa*) – viz. *jñāna*, *śabda* and *dīpa*, which illumine their own selves as also others appearing to be

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13. Cf. *satyaṃ vastu tadākārair asatyair avadhāryate /*
asatyopādhibhiḥ śabdaiḥ satyam evābhidhīyate //
Vākyapadīya, III. 2. 2.

In this connection reference might be made to Helārāja's comments on *Vākyapadiya*, III. 8. 35. (*Kriyā-samuddeśa* : *sattā sva-śakti-yogena sarva-rūpā vyavasthitā / sādhyā ca sādhanaṃ caiva phalaṃ bhoktā phalasya ca //*) — *sarvatra bhoktrādiṣu sanmātrasya saṃvidrūpasyānugamāt tasyaiva satyatā / vikalpa-parighaṭitas tu nānā-vyavahāraḥ iti sarvādvaita-vādiṣu samānam etat /*

distinct from them simultaneously,[14] it is *śabda* that is the holiest and sublimest (*puṇyatama*). because it lies at the basis of illumination of the other two - viz. *jñāna* and *dīpa* - as well. Thus, it is but quite rational according to Bhartṛhari that *śabda-brahma* is both pure Being (*sattā*) and pure Consciousness (*caitanya*) inalienably intertwined, and this nature breaks through every verbal element as also its objective counterpart in the phenomenal universe. Not only that. *Śabda-brahman* is also *rasa* - i. e. Bliss (*ānanda*). Bhartṛhari calls the speech of the learned, and *ipso facto* the Ultimate Reality (*śabda-brahma / sphoṭa*) revealed through it, as *paramo rasaḥ*, the rest being but *ṛjīṣa*.[15] In one of the verses quoted in Harivṛṣabha's gloss on *Vākyapadīya*, I. 142 from a source referred to as *Itihāsa*, we read :

gaur iva prakṣaraty ekā rasam uttama-śālinī /
divyādivyena rūpeṇa bhāratī gauḥ śuci-smitā //[16]

This recalls to our mind the famous Upaniṣadic saying :

raso vai saḥ / rasaṃ hyevāyaṃ labdhvā'nandī bhavati //

So, *śabda-brahman*, which is pure Being and pure Consciousness is also at the same time pure Bliss (*ānanda-rasa*). Thus, the parallelism between the metaphysical view as propounded by Bhartṛhari in his system in respect of the nature of *śabda-brahman*, or the Ultimate Reality, which shines forth through the phenomenal universe evolving as *vācya* and *vācaka*, along two

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14. Compare : *iha trīṇi jyotīṃṣi trayaḥ prakāśāḥ svarūpa-pararūpayor avadyotakāḥ / tad yathā - yo'yaṃ jātavedāḥ yaś ca puruṣeṣv āntaraḥ prakāśo yaś ca prakāśāprakāśayoḥ prakāśayitā śabdākhyaḥ prakāśas tatraitat sarvaṃ upaṃbaddham yāvat sthāsnu cariṣṇu ca /* — Harivṛṣabha's *vṛtti* on *Vākyapadīya* I. 12.

15. Cf. *paramo rasa .. iti / vācakatvād abhyudaya-hetutvāc ca vyavasthita-sādhubhāvaḥ śabda-samūho'bhidhīyate / evam hy āha — ṛjīṣam etad vāco yaḥ saṃskārahīnaḥ śabdaḥ* — Harivṛṣabha's *vṛtti* on *Vākyapadīya*, I. 12.

16. This reminds one of the verse attributed to Bhaṭṭanāyaka and cited by Abhinavagupta in his *Locana* on *Dhvanyāloka*, I. :

vāgdhenur dugdha etaṃ hi rasaṃ yad bāla-tṛṣṇayā /
tena nāsya samaḥ sa syād duhyate yogibhir hi yaḥ //

apparently distinct streams on the one hand and the Upaniṣadic conception of *Brahman* as *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda* manifesting Itself both as *nāman* and *rūpa* on the other is strikingly complete. It might be pointed out in this connection that Helārāja in his commentary on *Sādhana-samuddeśa* remarks *inter alia* that the great Patañjali was also an upholder of Monism (*advaita-naya*) as is evident from his observations concerning the validity of such usages as '*Kūlaṃ pipatiṣati.*'[17] Everything is the manifestation of *Brahman* - be it *vācaka* (Word) or *vācya* (Meaning), which are but other names of *nāman* and *rūpa* respectively. Koṇḍa Bhaṭṭa, while commenting on the *Vaiyākaraṇa-Bhūṣaṇa-Kārikā* 71 Viz. *satyāsatyau tu yau bhāgau......*, which is from Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya*, clearly states:

> *nityaṃ dravyam - iti pratīkam ādāya asatyopādhyava-cchinnaṃ brahma-tattvaṃ dravya-śabda-vācyam ity arthaḥ / brahma-rāśir - ity ādāya brahma-tattvam eva śabdasvarūpatayā bhātīti Kaiyaṭe spaṣṭam /*[18] *evaṃ vācyaṃ vācakaṃ ca brahmaiveti bhāvaḥ //*

The same theme is re-echoed in his *Vaiyākaraṇa-Bhūṣaṇa-Sāra* under verse 71. The analytic methods adopted by the Grammarians are but mere fictions of imagination pointing in the direction of *śabda-brahman*, the Ultimate Reality, just as in the

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17. Cf. *advaita-naye hi sarvam upaplavate asatyatvād — iti vikalpa-parighaṭitaḥ śābdo vyavahāraḥ pratīty-avicārita siddho 'bhyupagantav-yaḥ — iti digādi-padārthavat sādhana-padārtha-siddhiḥ / darśitam — iti advaita-nayāvalambibhiḥ Bhāṣyakāra-prabhṛtibhiḥ / kūlaṃ pipatiṣati — ityādi-prayogasiddhyartham ākhyātam ity arthaḥ/*—Helārāja on *Vākyapadīya* III. 7. 8 : *svatantra-paratantratva-kramarūpaṃ ca darśitam / nirīheṣv api bhāveṣu kalpanopanibandhanam //*

18. Reference, here, is to *Mahābhāṣya* text under P. I. 1. 2. on the *Vārttika* — *varṇa jñānaṃ vāg-viṣayo yatra ca brahma vartate* — viz. : *so'yam akṣara-samāmnāyo vāk-samāmnāyaḥ puṣpitaḥ phalitaś candra-tāra-kavat pratimaṇḍito veditavyo brahma-rāśiḥ /*

Compare : "To the spiritual insight of Patañjali *Varṇas* were not only phonetic types but glowing sparks of Brahman illumining the entire sphere of existence." — Dr. P. C. Chakravarti : *Spiritual Outlook of Sanskrit Grammar* in *Journal of the Department of Letters*, Vol. XXV (1934), p. 2.

Taittirīya Upaniṣad, Bhṛgu-vallī and *Ānanda-vallī*, the five sheaths (*pañca-kośa*) have been conceived as but stepping stones to the realisation of our Inmost Being, which is the substratum of all phenomenal appearances :

> *pañca-kośādivat tasmāt kalpanaiṣā samāśritā /*
> *upeya-pratipattyarthā upāyā avyavasthitāḥ //*

In explaining the *kārikā* Koṇḍa Bhaṭṭa observes:

> *evaṃ ca yathā pañca kośā api sarvādhāra-brahma-bodhanāyaivoktā na tu vāstavam eṣāṃ brahmatvaṃ tathaiva prakṛti-pratyādibhir vicāro'py-akhaṇḍa-sphoṭa-bodhanopāya iti bhāvaḥ //*[19]

Thus, in the concluding *kārikā* of the *Sphoṭa-nirṇaya* section of the *Vaiyākaraṇa-Bhūṣaṇa* (72), Bhaṭṭoji pays his obeisance to *Brahman*, which is *śabda-tattva*, which is *nirañjana, akṣara* and *pūrṇātman*, just like Brahman as taught in the Upaniṣads :

> *ittham niṣkṛṣya-māṇaṃ yac-chabdatattvaṃ nirañjanam /*
> *brahmaivety akṣaram prāhus tasmai pūrṇātmane namaḥ //*

– on which Koṇḍa Bhaṭṭa comments as follows :

> *nāma-rūpe vyākaravāṇi -iti śruti-prasiddhā dvayī sṛṣṭiḥ /*
> *tatra rūpasyeva nāmno'pi tad eva tattvam /*
> *janma-maraṇādikam tadvat-prapañcas ca tatrāvidyākalpita iti vedānta-tattvam asmākam apīṣṭam eva /*
> *uktaṃ hi Vākyapadīye – ajanmani tathā nitye paurvāparya-vivarjite /*
> *tattve janmādi-rūpatvaṃ viruddham upalabhyate // –iti*
> *tasmād avidyā-daśāyām uktarītyā jātir eva sphoṭaḥ /*
> *niṣkarṣe tu brahmaiva sphoṭa iti bhāvaḥ //*[20]

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19. For the Absolute as distinct from *ānandamaya-kośa* even see Saṅkara's *Viveka-cūḍāmaṇi*, (p. 214), where *Brahman* is referred to as *pañcakośa-vilakṣaṇa*.

20. On the *kārikā* '*ajanmani tathā nitye*' —(*Vākyapadīya*, III. 2. 18) Helārāja observes : *viruddham upalabhyate — iti vadann avidyāyām viro-*

(*Continued on the next page*)

VIII

At this stage the query might reasonably arise: If the *śabda-tattva* conceived as *brahman* in the grammatico-metaphysical system of Bhartṛhari be so closely akin to the Upaniṣadic conception of Brahman as Being, Consciousness and Bliss, what can be the *raison d'être* of posing a new metaphysical doctrine which ultimately reduces itself to Vedāntic Monism? How is *śabda-brahman* to be differentiated from *brahman* of the Upaniṣads? This, indeed, is a very cogent query and it must have to be faced and answered satisfactorily before the doctrine of *śabda-brahman* can be regarded as a novel and valid contribution in the field of philosophical inquiry. Bhartṛhari's arguments in favour of considering *śabda* as the ubiquitous and eternal principle underlying all our activities within the limits of the phenomenal universe and as the sole ground of its diversities and differentiations are mainly that all our cognitions of objects are imbued with the corresponding verbal counterparts and that the identity of *śabda* with *artha* on the one hand and the corresponding cognition on the other is firmly established by such usages as *gaur iti jñānam, gaur iti śabdaḥ,* and *gaur ity arthaḥ,* where we identify the verbal concept with *jñāna, śabda* and *artha.* Even the cognitions of a child, an uneducated rustic and birds and beasts are shot through with *śabda,* though not as distinct as in the case of grown up men acquainted with the use of language as the medium of communication. In Bhartṛhari's view in the case of new-born baby or an animal of lower species *śabda-bhāvanā,*[21]

(*Continued from the last page*)

dham abhyupaiti / etad eva hy avidyāyāḥ svarūpaṃ yad anupapadyamānam apy ābhāsopagamaṃ nayati upapannatve vidyaiva syāt / tasmād asatya-prapañca-prakāśana-śaktir brahmaṇo'nādi-siddhā grāhya-grāhaka-yugalaṃ svānurūpam uparacayya jagan-nāṭyam ātanoti tyavicārita-ramaṇīyābhimānam apanayanti tattva-dṛśaḥ /

21. The expression *śabda-bhāvanā* occurs in *Vākyapadīya*, I. 122:

ādyaḥ karaṇa-vinyāsaḥ prāṇasyordhvaṃ samīraṇam /
sthānānām abhighātaś ca na vinā śabda-bhāvanām //

This *śabda-bhāvanā* is 'beginningless', is 'beyond the scope of human

(*Continued on the next page*)

the subtle impressions of *śabda* are stored in the inner psychosis as seeds which make all activities possible. As he says :

> *itikartavyatā loke sarvā śabda-vyapāśrayā |*
> *yāṃ pūrvāhita-saṃskāro bālo'pi pratipadyate ||*

Abhinavagupta, in his gloss on Bharata's *Nāṭya-śāstra*, XX. 26 : *yā vāk-pradhānā...sā Bhāratī*, observes :

> *na hy eko'pi kaścic ceṣṭāṁśo'sti | kāya-ceṣṭā api hi mānasībhiḥ sūkṣmābhiś ca vācikībhiś ceṣṭābhir vyāpyanta eva | na so'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamād ṛte' iti nyāyāt |*[22]

Śabda as conceived in Bhartṛhari's system is the very consciousness (*samjñā/pratibhā*) itself :

> *saiṣā saṃsāriṇāṃ saṃjñā bahir antaś ca vartate |**

If this universal and all-pervasive potency (*śakti*) residing in *vāk* disappears, there would be no illumination (*prakāśa*) anywhere and life would be reduced to an inorganic mass devoid of the least tinge of consciousness in it. In the words of Bhartṛhari :

> *arthakriyāsu vāk sarvān samīhayati dehinaḥ |*
> *tad-utkrāntau visaṃjño 'yaṃ dṛśyate kāṣṭha-kuḍyavat ||*

(*Continued from the last page*)

effort ' and is embodied in the mind of every individual in the form of a subtle seed in which all knowledge is dormant. As it has been explained in the *vṛtti* : *anādiś caiṣā śabda-bhāvanā prati-puruṣam svasthita-jñāna-bīja-parigrahā | na hy etasyāḥ katham api pauruṣeyatvam sambhavati |* This *śabda-bhāvanā* is again identified with *Pratibhā* as it has been observed in the *vṛtti* : *tathā hy-anupadeśa-sādhyāḥ pratibhā-gamyā eva karaṇa-vinyāsādayaḥ |* Dr. Iyer notes : " *Pratibhā* seems to be another name for *śabda-bhāvanā*. It stands (1) for the residual traces of the exercise of the faculty of speech in the previous birth; (2) for the faculty of speech with which the child is born; (3) for the child's instinct to do something in response to a situation." — *loc. cit.* It may be noted in this connection that Vācaspati Miśra has quoted and explained this *kārikā* of Bhartṛhari in his *Nyāya-Kaṇikā*.

22. *Vākyapadīya of Śrī Bhartṛhari |* Ed, Prof. K. V. Abhyankar and Acarya V. P. Limaye, Appendix III, p. 209.

But these lofty claims of Bhartṛhari regarding the role of Speech (*Vāk*) in the universe have been vehemently refuted by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in his *Nyāya-Mañjarī*, as also by Kumārila in his *Śloka-vārtika*. Kumārila disowns Bhartṛhari's claim that the identity of *śabda* with *artha* and *jñāna* is clearly comprehended by us. In order to bring out the intrinsic difference underlying the nature of three elements Kumārila asserts :

gavi sāsnādimad-rūpā gādi-rūpā'bhidhāyake /
nirākārobhaya-jñāne saṃvittiḥ paramārthataḥ //*
— *Śloka-varttika* 185 on *Pratyakṣasūtra*

Śabda, according to the Mīmāṁsists, is just a means like the lamp or the organ of sight towards comprehension of an object as qualified by a particular property and the means (*upāya*) cannot be identified with the end (*upeya*). As Kumārila declares :

na copeye 'bhyupāyasya rūpādhyāsaḥ prasajyate /
na hi dīpendriyādīnāṃ rūpādhyāropa iṣyate //*

So, in his opinion, the comprehension of identity between *śabda*, *artha* and *jñāna*, which forms the bed-rock of Bhartṛhari's metaphysics, is nothing but a chimera.

The Naiyāyikas are too no less severe in their attack against Bhartṛhari's metaphysical concept of *Vāk*. The conception of three levels of *vāk* - viz. *Vaikharī*, *Madhyamā* and *Paśyantī*, is, according to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, nothing but a fiction. *Madhyamā* is nothing but inner consciousness comprising both *vācya* (meaning) and *vācaka* (verbal element) as its objects without shedding in the least its intrinsic nature *quā* consciousness as distinct from its objects. *Paśyantī*, on the other hand, is but another name of indeterminate cognition (*nirvikalpaka-jñāna*), and though it is illuminatory in character, it is unwarranted to conceive it as identical with *vāk*, as Bhartṛhari and his followers do. Cognition alienated from the element of *vāk* is as much possible and valid as when associated with *vāk*, and it is not at all rational to think of cognition dissociated from *vāk* as inert and bereft of the potency of illumination as the *Śabdādvaita-*

vādins erroneously think. Thus, the thesis relating to the determinate character of all cognitions invariably associated as they are with the corresponding verbal element, as the *Śabdādvaita-vādins* endeavour to establish, has no sound basis to stand upon. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa has thus summed up the position of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* pluralists in the following verses :

antaḥ-saṃkalpo varṇyate madhyamā vāk
seyaṃ buddhyātmā naiṣa vācaḥ prabhedaḥ /
buddhir vācyaṃ vācakaṃ collikhantī
rūpaṃ nātmīyaṃ bodha-bhāvaṃ jahāti //

paśyantīti tu nirvikalpakamater nāmāntaraṃ kalpitaṃ
vijñānasya hi na prakāśavapuṣo vāgrūpatā śāśvatī /
jāte 'smin viṣayāvabhāsini tataḥ syād vā'vamarśo giro
na syād vāpi na jātu vāg-virahite bodho jaḍatvaṃ
spṛśet //[23]

In short *Vaikhari* is the only form of speech that is conceivable and Bhartṛhari's metaphysical super-structure falls to the ground with the demolition of the three levels of speech, which form its corner-stone. As Jayanta Bhaṭṭa notes :

yat punar avādi vācas traividhyaṃ tad api nānumanyante /
ekaiva vaikharī vāg vāg – iti prasiddhā hı //[24]

In connection with his refutation of *śabda-vivarta-vāda* Jnyanta observes that if *śabda-brahman* be endowed with its innate properties of consciousness, being, bliss and ubiquity in consonance with the Upaniṣadic utterance – viz. " *vijñānaṃ ānandam brahma*," it becomes nothing but a novel nomenclature for Supreme Godhead (*Īśvara*) as conceived by the Naiyāyikas. As Jayanta states :

atha ' vijñānam ānandaṃ brahma ' ity āgama-vacanam anusaratā vibhutvam iva cetanatvam api śabda-

23. *Nyāya-mañjarī*, Vol. I, p. 355 (Kashi Sanskrit Series Edn.)
24. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 355.

*brahmaṇo varṇyate tarhīśvarasyaiva śabda-brahmeti nāma kṛtaṃ syāt //**

Besides, the existence of two *brahmana*-s – viz. one *śabda-brahman* and the other *para-brahman*, as pointed out in the oft-quoted verse :

dve brahmaṇī veditavye śabda-brahma paraṃ ca yat /
śabda-brahmaṇi niṣṇātaḥ param brahmādhigacchati //[25]

– has been sarcastically derided by Jayanta with the remark that it is, indeed, an abnormal phenomenon, which can be called *brahma-subhikṣa*, where *brahman* can be accessible according to our own sweet will irrespective of numbers, and if one of these two *brahman*-s be fictitious, it is indeed not proper to designate it as *brahman*, whereas if both of them be equally real the Monism of the Grammarians becomes untenable. So, Jayanta concludes his critique of *śabdādvaita-vāda* with the following cryptic joke :

yad apy ucyate 'dve brahmaṇī veditavye...' iti tad api brahma-subhikṣam atyantam alaukikam ekatarasya brahmaṇaḥ kālpanikatvāt / akālpanikatve vā katham advaita-vādaḥ? tasmāt kṛtam etena śabda-brahmaṇā / svasti parasmai brahmaṇe bhūyāt... //[26]

The Vedantists of Śaṅkara's school are equally stringent in their attack on *śabdādvaita-vāda* of the Grammarians. In Vimuktātman's *Iṣṭa-siddhi* this monistic doctrine has been refuted point by point in the first chapter, *kārikās* 73–76 and the gloss thereon. The main grounds of his attack are as follows :

25. *Tripura-tāpinyupaniṣad*, 5. 17 with the variant *hi mantavye* for *veditavye*.

26. *Nyāya-mañjarī*, Vol. II, p. 103. In the *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha* (Section on *Pāṇini-Darśana*, XIII. 274–284) the hemistich *śabda-brahmaṇi niṣṇātaḥ* — is attributed to *abhiyukta*, who is Vyāsa. See *Mahābhārata*, 12. 224. 10; also, 12. 262. 1 (Critical Edition, Poona).

(1) the same *śabda* cannot be both *vācya* and *vaktṛ*. As he notes :

> *āha śabdaḥ svayaṃ vācya iti śabdo na tat tathā |*
> *aikye hi vaktṛtā vā syād vācyatā vā na tūbhayam ||**

(2) The doctrine that both *vācya* and *vācaka* are but *vivarta*-s of *śabda-brahman* and have, therefore, been identified with *brahman* goes against the express declaration of the Upaniṣads that *brahman* is *a-śabda*, other than *śabda*, in such statements as : *aśabdam asparśam arūpam avyayam*....... Besides, if *śabda* be conceived as *buddhi-grāhya* in its subtle form, it cannot be regarded as *svayam-prakāśa*. On the other hand, if it is regarded as *svayam-prakāśa*, it reduces itself to nothing but Upaniṣadic Self, which by no means can be identified with *śabda*. As Vimuktātman observes in his comments on *Iṣṭa-siddhi*, I. 75 :

> *na ca śabdo brahmeti śrutir asti | yadi nāmāsti tathāpi sā anya-parā | na tu śabdasya brahmatvam brahmaṇo vā śabdatvaṃ vadet |... 'yad vācā'nabhyuditaṃ yena vāg abhyudyate', 'yac chrotreṇa na sṛṇoti', aśabdam asparśam – ityāder na śabdo brahma nāpi śabdavad iti śrutam | ataḥ śabdo brahmety ayuktam |... ato na śabdādvaita-siddhiḥ |*

(3) What more, if *śabda* is regarded as *brahman*, *brahman* is apparently reduced to something that is external (*parāk*) and not the innermost principle (*pratyak*) like our conscious Self (*ātman*). So it is more logical to subscribe to the monistic view of *ātmādvaita* and repudiate the doctrine of *śabdādvaita* as propounded by the Grammarians, which is as much valid as *ghaṭādvaita*, as has been scathingly put forth by Vimuktātman :

> *śabdo brahmety ukte parāgeva brahma uktam ajño manyate na tu pratyak | ātmaśabdenānuktatvāc ca | ato 'haṃ brahmeti dhīr na bhavet, anātmā brahmeti vā dhīr bhavet | tadā 'ahaṃ brahmāsmī' tyādi-śruti-virodhaḥ | ...tasmād ātmādvaitam eva sidhyati, na śābdādvaitaṃ ghaṭādvaitaṃ veti siddham ||** (*Iṣṭa-siddhi*, p. 176)

IX

Thus, Bhartṛhari's doctrine, which is based upon *āgama*[27] or unbroken tradition, as he himself claims, is unique in the history of metaphysical speculations of India. It is not merely based on *tarka* or discursive reasoning, but has its firm roots in the mystic spiritual experiences of the great seers of old, which in their turn are based upon *āgama*-s. As Bhartṛhari boldly declares:

na cāgamad ṛte dharmas tarkeṇa vyavatiṣṭhate |
ṛṣīṇām api yaj jñānaṃ tad apy āgamapūrvakam ||
(*VP*. I. 30)

Bhartṛhari likens *āgama* to *caitanya* or consciousness, which is ever-existent in an unbroken continuity. As he states:

caitanyam iva yaś cāyam avicchedena vartate |
āgamas tam upāsīno hetuvādair na bādhyate ||
(*VP*. I. 41)

So, the wisdom that is stored in the *āgama*-s and re-inforced by the direct perceptual realisations of the distinguished seers affiliated to the respective *āgama*-s cannot be invalidated by *tarka* or *hetuvāda* or argumentative reasonings running counter to those *āgama*-s. And of all the *āgama*-s Bhartṛhari regards *trayī* alone as the seed which persists for ever even when all the rival *āgamas* disappear without leaving any trace behind. As he says:

na jātv akartṛkaṃ kaścid āgamam pratipadyate |
*bījaṃ sarvāgamāpāye trayy evāto vyavasthitā ||**
(*VP*. I. 133)

Thus, Bhartṛhari's doctrine has its basis in *āgama*, has been re-inforced by the direct personal experiences of seers in their state of spiritual trance, and lastly, has been established as valid by reasoning (*tarka*) as well, which does not run counter to the wisdom embodied in the *āgama*-s, since *tarka* which does not go

27. For the different senses in which the word *āgama* has been used by Bhartṛhari Dr. Iyer's note I on *Vākyapadīya*, I. 132 may be consulted.

against the Vedas and *śāstra*-s, that constitute the *āgama*, is like eyes illuminating the true essence of things to those who are devoid of their own power of discrimination. In the words of Bhartṛhari : *veda-śāstrāvirodhī ca tarkaś cakṣur apaśyatām.*[28] Bhartṛhari in the concluding verses of the second *Kāṇḍa* of his *magnum opus* sings in praise of the ancient *āgama*-s (*purāṇa-āgama*) and calls his treatise as *Āgama-samuccaya*, a systematizations of the traditional teachings relating to *Vyākaraṇāgama* undertaken under the inspiration of his preceptor.[29]

According to Bhartṛhari and the metaphysical school to which he is affiliated *Vyākaraṇāgama* is not merely concerned with an analytical study of the correct form of speech as spoken by the learned (*śiṣṭa*-s), it is also the gateway to the ultimate goal of human existence, the *summum bonum* of our life – viz. salvation (*apavarga*). As he declares in one of the memorable verses of *Brahma-kāṇḍa* :

tad dvāram apavargasya vāṅ-malānāṃ cikitsitam /
*pavitraṃ sarva-vidyānām adhividyam prakāśate //**[30]
(*VP*. I. 14)

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28. Bhartṛhari has dwelt upon the relation between *āgama* and *tarka* on numerous occasions in his *Vākyapadīya*. For *āgama* see *Vākyapadīya* — I. 27, 30, 130, III. 2. 7. (unbroken tradition); (2) I. 41, etc., III. 2. 7, III. 3. 11, III. 8. 24, III. 11. 9 etc. (Rule of conduct observed by an unbroken traditional practice); (3) I. 141 (Scriptural work laying down unbroken tradition). Similarly, for *tarka* consult *Vākyapadīya*, I. 30, 48, 136, 138 (Method of drawing conclusions from inference, analogy and the like which is admissible, provided it does not go against scriptural and sacred literature which is accepted as an established truth). *Vide* Abhyankar and Limaye, *op. cit.*, Appendix V. In this connection Prof. K. Satchidananda Murty's *Revelation and Reason in Advaita Vedānta* might be consulted with profit.

29. *Vide Vākyapadīya*, II. 482–487. That the Science of Grammar too was a distinct *āgama* has been clearly stated in II. 482 : *yaḥ Patañjali-śiṣyebhyo bhraṣṭo vyākaraṇāgamaḥ*; so also *tad vyākaraṇam āgamya paraṃ brahmādhigamyate* (I. 22). It has also been referred to as *Vyākaraṇa-smṛtiḥ* : *sādhutvajñāna-viṣayā saiṣā vyākaraṇa-smṛtiḥ* (I. 142).

30. These two are as it were the 'flower' (*puṣpa*) and 'fruit' (*phala*) of the knowledge of *śabda-vidyā* or the Science of Grammar.

(*Continued on next page*)

" It (Grammar) is the door to salvation, the remedy for all the impurites of speech, the purifier of all the sciences and shines in every branch of knowledge ".*

Again :

> *idam ādyaṃ pada-sthānaṃ siddhisopāna-parvaṇām |*
> *iyaṃ sā mokṣamāṇānam ajihmā rāja-paddhatiḥ ||**
>
> (*VP*. I. 16)

(*Continued from the last page*)

These two stages are hinted at in *Vākyapadīya*, I. 131 :

> *tasmād yaḥ śabda-saṃskāraḥ sā siddhiḥ paramātmanaḥ |*
> *tasya pravṛtti-tattvajñas tad Brahmāmṛtam aśnute ||*

— and Harivṛṣabha's commentary thereon. Compare : " The knowledge and correct use of words enables one to acieve happiness or spiritual merit in this life and in heaven... That is the first goal or 'flower' (*puṣpita*) the study of grammar can bring. The second goal significantly called the 'fruit' (*phalita*), includes the first but goes well beyond - it is the realisation of *mokṣa*, or complete union with *śabda-brahman*. In reaching *mokṣa* the knowledge and correct use of words is but the first step on the path. What are the subsequent steps ? Here the *Vākyapadīya* becomes vague, although some clues are offered. " — Harold G. Coward : *Bhartṛhari*, p. 50. The imagery of *puṣpa* and *phala* is found to be employed not infrequently in connection with the discussion of words and their meanings by such great teachers as Yāska, Patañjali and Kumārila. For example, in *Nirukta*, I. 20 Yāska states : *arthaṃ vācaḥ puṣpa-phalam āha | yājña-daivate puṣpa-phale | devatā-dhyātme vā* — while explaining the *ṛk ṚV*. X. 71. 5 : *adhenvā carati māyayaiṣā | vācaṃ śuśruvā̃ aphalām apuṣpām ||*. Patañjali, while commenting on the *Vārttika* : *varṇajñānaṃ vāg-viṣayo yatra ca brahma vartate* observes : *so 'yam akṣara-samāmnāyo vāk-samāmnāyaḥ puṣpitaḥ phalitaś candra-tārakavat pratimaṇḍito veditavyo brahma-rāśiḥ* | — *Paspaśā-Āhnika*. Similarly, Kumārila in his *Tantra-vārttika* on *Jaiminīya-Sūtra*, I. 3. 30 remarks :

> *padāt prabhṛti yā caiṣā prajñā jñātur vijṛmbhate |*
> *puṣpitā sā padārtheṣu vākyārtheṣu phaliṣyati ||*

— as quoted by Jayanta in his *Nyāya-mañjarī*, Vol. I, p. 372. The latter takes his cue from Kumārila and elaborates the imagery further in the following verse clarifying the position of the Mīmāṃsakas regarding the process of verbal cognition : *seyaṃ vyutpatti-mūlā pada-visara-samudbhidyamānāṅkuraśrīḥ | saṃskārodāra-patrā kusumacayavatī prollasadbhiḥ padārthaiḥ | prajñā-vallī viśālā phalati phalam idaṃ svāduvākyārtha-tattvaiḥ | nairākāṅkṣyaṃ lasadbhir hṛdayam upagate yānti yasmin pumāṃsaḥ ||* — *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 372.

"This is the first step in the ladder leading to liberation, this the straight royal road for all those who desire salvation".

Now, it might be legitimately asked : What sort of salvation (*apavarga*) is aimed to be achieved by the study of Grammar? We can understand the nature of *apavarga* which stands out as the goal of such philosophical systems as *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya-Yoga* and *Vedānta*, which is conceived as *duḥkhātyanta-nivṛtti*, though the nature of that goal has been interpreted differently in different systems. But what can be the nature of salvation set up by the theorists professing *śabda-tattva* as *Brahman*? And what is the path laid down by them for its attainment? Bhartṛhari has very thoroughly dealt with the all-pervasive character of the principle of speech (*vāk*) from the lowest level (*vaikharī*) reaching upto its highest and subtlest – viz. *paśyantī*. But he is not so very thorough or methodical as regards the nature of salvation or the path leading to it.

As in the case of other philosophical systems the final realisation of the ultimate goal depends upon spiritual discipline leading to concentration of mind by making it averse to everything that is non-essential. This control of mind and its faculties by turning them inward (*pratyak*) and restraining them from being engrossed by things external (*parāk*) is known as *Yoga*, which is defined by Patañjali as *Yogaś citta-vṛtti-nirodhaḥ*. This *Yoga* as propaedeutic to the attainment of salvation, which consists in complete freedom and release from all kinds of bondage in the form of ignorance and doubt, is accepted not by a particular philosophical sect alone, but by all philosophical systems irrespective of their respective metaphysical or religious affiliation, to the exclusion of Cārvākas and Mīmāṃsists.[31] Thus,

31. "Although the *Yogasūtra*-s are written within the context of the Sāṃkhya School of Metaphysics, the focus throughout is on the analysis of the psychological processes commonly accepted by all of the various schools–orthodox and heterodox alike... T. H. Stcherbatsky, the eminent Russian scholar of Buddhism, observes that Yogic trance (*samāhdi*) and Yogic courses for the training of the mind in the achievement of *mokṣa* or *nirvāṇa*

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it is but quite expected that the Grammarians, too, should adopt the methods and techniques of Yoga-psychology which was availed of by most of the time-honoured philosophical traditions as a means towards attainment of *apavarga*, *mokṣa* or *nirvāṇa*, whatever might be the designation of that state of liberation. It is true that Bhartṛhari has not discussed in detail the stages through which our mind has to pass from the level of *vaikharī* to that of *paśyantī*, but there are traces in the *Vākyapadīya* and *vṛtti* thereon which can help us reconstruct the process of gradual liberation. We find the expression *śabdapūrva-yoga* (*śabda-pūrveṇa yogena*) employed in *Vākyapadīya*, I. 20, which has been translated by Professor Iyer as *Yoga preceded by the knowledge and use of the correct forms of word*. But the expression *śabdapūrva-yoga* is most probably equivalent to *śabda-yoga*, like *karma-yoga*, *jñāna-yoga* and *bhaktiyoga*, and is nothing but a variant of *vāg-yoga* which occurs in the expression *vāgyoga-vid* in the verse cited by Patañjali in the *Paspaśā*. It is an elliptical expression for *śabda-yoga* and has its parallel in such usages as *daśa-pūrva-ratham yam ākhyayā**, *deva-pūrvam girim te* of Kālidāsa and *hiraṇya-pūrvaṃ kaśipum pracakṣate** of Māgha for *Daśaratha*, *Devagiri* and *Hiraṇya-kaśipu* respectively.[32] Again in the *vṛtti* on *Vākyapadīya*, I. 14 :

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(*yoga-mārga*) appear in virtually all schools of thought – be they Hindu, Buddhist or Jaina. And Mircea Eliade in his well-known book : *Yoga Immortality and Freedom*, maintains that Yoga is one of the four basic motifs of all Indian thought." — Coward, *Op. cit.*, p. 54. The other three motifs named by Eliade are *karma*, *māyā*, and *nirvāṇa*. See Eliade, *Op. cit.*, chapter three, note 4.

32. This sort of elliptical usage has been regarded as a poetic defect known as *avācya-vacana* by Ālaṁkārikas. While commenting on *Śiśupāla-vadha*, I. 42 Mallinātha observes :

> *yaṃ daityaṃ hiraṇya-pūrvaṃ kaśipuṃ pracakṣate / hiraṇya-kaśipum āhur ity arthaḥ / atra hiraṇya-śabda-pūrvatvaṃ kaśipu-śabdasyaiva na tu saṃjñinas tadarthasya iti śabda-parasya kaśipu-śabdasyārthagatatvenāprayojyasya prayogād avācya-vacanākhyārtha-doṣam āhuḥ / 'yad evāvācyavacanam avācya-vacanaṃ hi tad' iti samādhānam / evaṃvidha-viṣaye śabdapareṇārtha-lakṣaṇeti kathañcit sampādyam – ity uktam asmābhiḥ / 'deva-pūrvaṃ giriṃ te' iti, 'dhanur-upapadam asmai vedam abhyādiśa' ity etad-vyākhyānāvasare sañjīvanyāṃ ghaṇṭāpathe ca / .... — Sarvaṃkaṣā.*

tad dvāram apavargasya vāṅ-malāmāṃ cikitsitam

the same expression *śabdapūrva-yoga* is found to be employed and the different stages of that *yoga* are succinctly indicated in the following excerpt :

> *śabdapūrvaṃ hi śabda-svarūpasyābheda-tattvajñaḥ kramasaṃhāreṇa yogaṃ labhate / sādhu-prayogāc cābhivyakta-dharma-viśeṣaḥ mahāntaṃ śabdātmānam abhisambhavan vaikaraṇyaṃ prāpnoti / so 'vyatikīrṇāṃ vāg-avasthām adhigamya vāg-vikārāṇāṃ prakṛtiṃ pratibhām anuparaiti / tasmāc ca sattānuguṇya-mātrāt pratibhākhyāt śabdapūrva-yoga-bhāvanābhyāsākṣepāt pratyastamita-sarva-vikārollekha-mātrāṃ parāṃ prakṛtiṃ pratipadyate //*[33]

By the practice of *śabda-yoga*, the first step of which is the study of the correct form of speech as described and analysed in Grammar, a follower of this *yoga* becomes free from all pollutions (*mala*) attaching to his mind through the use of incorrect and impure speech and the subtle impressions thereof, and gradually rises to the level of *pratibhā*, or pure consciousness, the very womb of the phenomenal creation, in which all differences are merged, and which is Great Soul, the *Verbum*, constantly shining within us where there is no darkness in the form of ignorance, and where the distinction of *mūrti* and *vyāpāra* –

33. Dr. K, A. S. Iyer's note on this verse deserves consideration : "This verse is understood in the *vṛtti* as describing the stages through which the grammarian goes in attaining *mokṣa*. Vṛ. says : *etasyā eva brahmaprāpteḥ kramam idānīṃ varṇayan nāha – avyavakīrṇām iti.* Some, however, think that different forms of liberation are set forth here.

"One thing to be noted is that Bhartṛhari, in the *vṛtti*, speaks about going from *pratibhā* which is understood by Vṛ. as *paśyantī*, to *parā-prakṛtiḥ*. *Paśyantī* itself is called *sarva-vikārāṇāṃ prakṛtiḥ*. Thus *paśyantī* is *prakṛti* and after that comes *parā prakṛtiḥ*." — *Vākyapadīyam of Bhartṛhari*, note I on 1. 14.

form and activity, is no longer traceable.[34] *Vāk*, according to Bhartṛhari, is the *parā-prakṛti*, and as *paśyantī* it is identical with *pratibhā*, which again is equivalent to *praṇava*, which is *śabda-brahman* Itself. So, when the Yogin affiliated to the path of *śabdapūrvaka-yoga* or *vāg-yoga*, gradually rises to the level of *paśyantī* by getting rid of the impurities in the form of differentiation, spatial and temporal sequence, distinction between *sādhya*, *sādhana*, and *siddhi*, *draṣṭṛ*, *dṛśya* and *darśana*, *kartṛ*, *kārya* and *kāraṇa*, he becomes completely identified with the Supreme Deity (*mahān devaḥ*), *Śabda-tattva*, that is ever shining and illuminating the universe in all its seeming diversities, which are nothing but *vivarta*-s or illusory manifestations serving only to keep us in constant bondage by concealing the true nature of our consciousness which is inalienable from that *parā vāk*. To rise to that state of supreme illumination one has to practise *yoga*, also described as *kramasaṃhāra-yoga*, which lifts him gradually from the level of *prāṇa* to the highest level where union with the Supreme Illumination (*parā-jyotiḥ*) is achieved. That is the highest goal, the attainment of Supreme Good (*kṣema-prāpti*).[35] In that state of Supreme Union all bonds are severed (*chinna-bandhana chinna-granthi*). This is *brahma-sāyuiya* - union with *brahman*, which is also the goal of *Advaita Vedānta*.

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34. We have also a description of the nature of final illumination in the verses cited in the *vṛtti* on *Vākyapadīya*, I. 1 and 142 introduced with the remarks : *tathā hy uktam* and *tatretihāseṣu nidarśanāny upalabhyante* respectively. The expression *śabda-pūrva-yoga* occurs also in the *vṛtti* on I. 142 : *tasyā eva vāco vyākaraṇena sādhutva-jñāna-labhyena vā śabdapūrvena yogenādhigamyate - ity ekeṣām āgamaḥ*. In the *vṛtti* on *Vākyapadīya*, I. 131 we have again the expression *śabda-pūrvaka yoga* : *tadabhyāsāc ca śabda-pūrvakaṃ yogaṃ adhigamya pratibhāṃ tattvaprabhavāṃ bhāva-vikāra-prakṛtiṃ sattāṃ sādhya-sādhana-śakti-yuktāṃ samyag-avabudhya niyatā kṣema-prāptir - iti*.

35. *Vide* : "The attributes whereby the Vedāntins describe Brahman or the absolute have all been used by Patañjali in his interpretation of *nitya-śabda*." — Dr. P. C. Cakravarti in *Cultural Heritage of India*, Vol. V. Patañjali in his *Paspaśā* on P. I. 1. 1 employs the epithets *dhruva*, *kūṭa-stha*, *avicāli*, *anapāyopajana-vikāri*, *avṛddhi*, *avyaya-yogi* that are frequently applied with reference to *para-brahman* in the *Upaniṣads*.

In the *vṛtti* on *Vākyapadīya*, I. 131 are quoted the following verses of unknown authorship, which describe the final state of illumination and are closely reminiscent of the Upaniṣadic saying :—

bhidyate hṛdaya-granthiś chidyante sarva-saṃśayāḥ |
kṣīyante cāsya karmāṇi tasmin dṛṣṭe parāvare ||
āha ca — prāṇa-vṛttim atikramya vācas tattve vyavasthitaḥ |
krama-saṃhārayogeṇa saṃhṛtyātmānam ātmani ||
vācaḥ saṃskāram ādhāya vācaṃ jñāne niveśya ca ||
vibhajya bandhanāny asyāḥ kṛtvā tām chinna-bandhanām ||
jyotir āntaram āsādya cchinna-granthi - parigrahaḥ ||
pareṇa jyotiṣaikatvaṃ chittvā granthīn prapadyate ||

Bhartṛhari distinguishes between two kinds of *śabda* - one *kārya* or ephemeral and the other *nitya* or eternal. The nature of eternal *śabda* has been described in terms that are employed with reference to *para-brahman* by the Upaniṣadic seers in the following *vṛtti* - text on *Vākyapadīya*, I. 130. viz. : *api prayoktur ātmānaṃ śabdam antar avasthitam*..., which deserves serious consideration :

nityas tu sarva-vyavahāra-yoniḥ saṃhṛta-kramaḥ sarveṣām antaḥsannivesī prabhavo vikārāṇām āsrayaḥ karmaṇām adhiṣṭhānaṃ sukha-duḥkhayoḥ sarvatrāpratihatakāryaśaktir ghaṭādi-niruddha iva prakāśaḥ parigṛhītabhogakṣetrāvadhiḥ sarva-mūrtīnām aparimāṇā prakṛtiḥ sarva-prabheda-rūpatayā ca nityapravṛtta-pratyavabhāsa-svapna-prabodhānukārī pravṛtti-nivṛtti-padābhyāṃ parjanyavad davāgnivac ca prasavocchedaśaktiyuktaḥ sarvesvāraḥ sarvaśaktir mahān śabda-vṛṣabhaḥ | tasmin khalu vāgyoga-vido vicchidyāhaṃkāra-granthīn atyanta-vinirbhāgeṇa saṃsṛjyante ||[36]

36. The *krama* or sequence which is experienced with reference to speech as also the origin of phenomena in the material plane is only apparent and due to our nescience, which disappears when the highest

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Bhartṛhari recognises two distinct stages in the path of realisation of spiritual purity (*śuddhi*) – one at the *upakrama* or beginning and the other at the end or *parisamāpti* in the following *kārikā* of the *Vākyapadīya* :

sarvārtha-rūpatā śuddhir jñānasya nirupāśrayā /
tato'pyasya parāṃ śuddhim eke prāhur arūpikām //[37]

The first stage consists in the simultaneous cognition of the entire cognisable universe as is possible in the case of the omniscient alone, independent of any operation of the sense-organs, while the final realisation of the Absolute *Śabda-brahman* as conceived by the philosophers of Bhartṛhari's system is of the nature of pure illumination, free from all traces of disturbance and beyond all differentiation as the *knower* and the *known*. As Helārāja clearly points out in his gloss on the *kārikā* just quoted :

dve daśe śuddher upakrama-parisamāpti-rūpe / indriyasannikarṣādi-rūpopāśraya-nirapekṣatayā-śeṣārthāva-

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level of realization is attained, there being neither sequence nor origin in the level of *paśyantī*, where the ultimate reality or *brahman*, devoid of sequence (*akrama*) and of parts (*abhāga*) shines forth in which both speech and the meaning as its objective counterpart are megred in an undifferentiated totality. Compare :

atyadbhutā tviyaṃ vṛttir yad abhāgaṃ yad akramam /
bhāgānāṃ prāg abhūtānām ātma-tattvaṃ prakāśate //
— *Vākyapadīya*, III. 3. 81.

See also : *akramaḥ krama-rūpeṇa bhedavān iva lakṣyate //*
— *Vākyapadīya*, I. 48 cd.

The concepts of *krama* and *krama-saṃhāra* in the states of nescience and final spiritual trance respectively are frequently alluded to in *Vākyapadīya*. Cf. *bhāgaśo bhajate kramam* (I. 51), *kramavān* in *vṛtti on* I. 3; *śabdākhyā upa-saṃhṛta-kramād brahmaṇaḥ* — *vṛtti* on I. 1; *kramapasṛṣṭa-rūpā vāk* — I. 86; *pratisaṃhṛta-kramā* .. *paśyantī* — *vṛtti* on I. 142 etc.

37. Helārāja employs the same identical epithets with reference to *brahman* in his gloss on *Vākyapadīya*, III. 1. 32 : *antyā parā prakṛtiḥ satyā sarvavikārānuyāyinī praśānta-kallolā cidekaghanā brahmety āgamavidaḥ /* Similarly on *Vākyapadīya*, III. 7. 42 : *dyauḥ kṣamā* .. .. *bahiravasthitāḥ /* Helārāja observes : *ekam eva saṃvinmayaṃ paraṃ śabdabrahma tathā tathā'vasthitam iti kārikārthaḥ*.

bhāsa-khacitaṃ sarvajña-jñānam upakrame śuddham ity ucyate / indriyādyapekṣā-rūpāyāḥ sva-viṣayagrahaṇe 'śuddher anavagamāt / niṣṭhāyāṃ cākāra-kāluṣyāpagamāt prabhāsvaram praśānta-kallolaṃ saṃvinmātram ekaghanaṃ śuddhaṃ grāhya-grāhaka-prapañca-śūnyaṃ paraṃ brahma //[38]

This unique realisation is the essence of *Vāk* as *paśyantī*, which transforms Itself as *Vaikharī* for the purpose of communication and appears as *śabda*, *artha* and *sambandha*, though ultimately they are non-distinct. As Helārāja observes while commenting on *Vākyapadīya*, III. 2. 11 :

samvic-ca paśyantī-rūpā parā vāk śabda-brahmamayīti brahma-tattvam śabdāt pāramārthikān-na bhidyate / vivarta-daśāyāṃ tu vaikharyātmanā bhedaḥ //[39]

This identity of *śabda*, *artha* and *sambandha* has been clearly pointed out in the following *kārikā* of *Vākyapadīya*, III. 2. 14 :

tasya śabdārtha-sambandha-rūpam ekasya dṛśyate /
tad dṛśyaṃ darśanam draṣṭā darśane ca prayojanam //

Śabda is nothing but a potency of *cit* and as such indistinguishable from the latter. As Helārāja notes :

iha śabdo nāma vācakaḥ sa ucyate yo'yaṃ cicchakteḥ vāg-ātmā vyāpāraḥ śabdanāpara-paryāyo'brūyamāno' pi upāṃśu-prayoge śabda iti vyavahriyate yataḥ / tasya prathamam udbhidyamānāvasthasyā-vibhāgāpanna-śabdārthamaya-svabhāvasya para-vāgātmanā svarūpeṇāvasthānam / paratas tu prāṇavṛttyanuprāṇita-manobhūmi-samavalambita-nija-svabhāvasya vācya-

38. Compare : *yat kila sarvāvasthāsv anugataṃ tad eva satyam / tac ca saṃvinmātra-rūpam abādhyamānam* / — Helārāja on *Vākyapadīya*, III. 2. 17–18. Also : *cit-sāmānyasya sarvatrānugamād eva mahāsattā-rūpam abhāvāpratiyogi viśvasya jagataḥ satya-rūpam avadāta-darśanaiḥ sākṣāt-kṛtyopadiṣṭam / pramāṇam nas te bhagavantaḥ* / — Helārāja on III. 1. 32.

39. Helārāja on *Vākyapadīya*, III. 3. 2.

vācaka-rūpa-bhinna-śākhādvayāvalambinaḥ samavas-thānam //[40]

According to Bhartṛhari's system all words refer to *brahman* or Absolute Reality, and in the ultimate analysis they are identical with It. Even words like *prithivī*, *ghaṭa* etc., that seem to refer to things distinct from *brahman*, have reference to the latter, though in a remote way, whereas words like *ātman*, *brahman* etc. are directly and immediately connected with the Supreme Reality, which is the core of all phenomenal appearance. As Bhartṛhari clearly states in the following *kārikā* (16) of the *Dravya-samuddeśa* section of the third *kāṇḍa* of *Vākyapadīya*:

vācyā sā sarva-śabdānāṃ śabdās ca na pṛthak tataḥ /
apṛthaktve ca sambandhas tayor nānātmanor iva //

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40. While commenting on the *kārikā* 3. 2. 1 Helārāja points out how the words *ātman* etc. as used in different philosophical systems can be ultimately interpreted as referring to one identical substance as qualified by varying adjuncts. Cf. :

tathā hi ātmādvaita-vādibhir ātma-śabdena tad dravyaṃ nirūpyate ātmaiva hy-upādhi-bhinnam pratibhāsamānaṃ 'dravya-padānām arthaḥ' — iti teṣāṃ darśanam ihaiva vakṣyamāṇam / vastu svalakṣaṇam artha-kriyā-kāri dravyam iti śākyair uktam / svabhāva - iti sattādvaita-vādibhiḥ sva-bhāva ātma-bhūtā sattā - iti kṛtvā / tathā hi kramarūpopa-saṃhāre sattaiva sattvam iti sva-sambandhibhir upādhibhir upahita-bhedā saiva dravyam / prakṛter ekadeśaḥ cetanaḥ puruṣaḥ tad-dvāreṇa śarīra-śarīriṇor avyatirekāt śarīraṃ dravyam pradhānam eva prākṛtikaiḥ śarīram evaikam ātmā yeṣām taiḥ śarīrātmabhir ucyate / tattvam iti caturbhūta-tattva-vādibhis Cārvākaiḥ dravyam ucyate / pṛthivy ap tejo vāyur iti tattvāni / tatsamudāye ca śarīrendriya-viṣaya-saṃjñeti vacanāt / tad evam etaiḥ paramārthata ekam eva vastu ucyate 'dravyam ity asya' -iti / dravyaṃ nāma yaḥ padārthaḥ tasyaita eva paryāyāḥ / eteṣām eva pārmārthika-rūpābhidhāyitvāt / nānye ghaṭādi-śabdāḥ /.......

— Only we must keep in mind that *dravya* here refers to the Transcendental Eternal Substance (*pāramārthika-dravya*) and not to ordinary substances like earth, water, etc. (*sāṃvyavahārika-dravya*) with which we have to deal in our day-to-day life. Cf. : *iha tu pāramārthikaṃ dravyaṃ nirūpyate* — Helārāja. And it is this *pāramārthika-dravya* which is regarded as the connotation of words by the sage Vyāḍi : *dravyābhidhānaṃ Vyāḍiḥ*. This *dravya* is eternal and immutable as Patañjali says in the *Paspaśā* : *dravyaṃ nityam ākṛtir anyā ānyā ca bhavati*.

That Absolute or Supreme Reality is referred to in Bhartṛhari's system as *ātman, vastu, svabhāva, śarīra, tattva* and *dravya* in different contexts as has been distinctly stated in the following *kārikā* (VP. III. 2. 1) :

ātmā vastu svabhāvaś ca śarīraṃ tattvaṃ ityapi |
dravyam ity asya paryāyās tac ca nityam iti sthitaṃ ||

That Supreme Reality pervades the entire universe as its substratum and manifests Itself as the phenomenal universe. Its *vivarta*, without any reality of its own, brought into being through the operation of Its intrinsic potencies (*śaktī*-s) indistinguishable from their substratum, is within our own selves, nay It is our Self itself. It is supreme, un-differentiated consciousness, the Great Deity (*maho devaḥ*). And it is our destiny to retrieve our identity with that Supreme Reality or *tattva* which is none other than *paśyantī*. To attain to that state of beatific trance one has to pass through the various stages of psychic concentration as laid down in the *Yoga-sūtras* of Patañjali. A description of that final state of illumination as conceived by the Grammatico-philosophical school of Bhartṛhari has been beautifully embodied in the following verse, which is usually cited by Sanskrit Poeticians as an illustration of the figure of speech *samāsokti* the process of Vedāntic illumination being *prima facie* super-imposed on the corresponding process of grammatical analysis :

uditavati parasmin pratyaye śāstra-yonau
gatavati vilayaṃ ca prākṛte'pi prapañce |
sapadi padam uditaṃ kevala-pratyayo yas
*tad iyad iti mimīte ko hṛdā paṇḍito'pi ||**

It is the *śiṣṭa*-s alone who are qualified to attain to that state of Supreme Illumination, where there is nothing other than pure consciousness in the shape of *paśyantī* endowed with its inalienable *vāk-śakti*, for they alone can visualise the truth. As Bhartṛhari states :

bhāva-tattva-dṛśaḥ śiṣṭāḥ śabdārtheṣu vyavasthitāḥ /
yad yad dharme 'ṅgatām eti liṅgaṃ tat tat pracakṣate //[41]

And it is the Vaiyākaraṇas who are *siṣṭa*-s *par excellence.* As Patañjali observes unambiguously :

*siṣṭā vaiyākaraṇāḥ / sāstra-pūrvikā hi śiṣṭiḥ / vaiyākaraṇās ca śāstrajñāḥ //**[42]

Thus, through *śabda saṃskāra* or analytical procedure laid down in Grammar for enabling us to perform the act of communication necessary for our mundane existence and faithful observation of the procedure of psychic concentration, which, in the context of Bhartṛhari's system is called *śabda-pūrvaka yoga*, we gradually attain to the status of *śiṣṭa*-s, having the power to gain a glimpse of the Ultimate beatific vision, consisting in liberation from the bonds of ignorance, pulling us down to the level of phenomenal existence. As it is laid down in one of the verses cited in the *vṛtti* on *Vākyapadīya*, I. 142 :

tasyāṃ dṛṣṭa-svarūpāyām adhikāro nivartate /
puruṣe ṣoḍaṣa-kale tām āhur amṛtāṃ kalām //

It is for this reason that Puṣpadanta, the great Gandharva chief, prays that he might be born again in the family of grammarians, if he has to appear in mortal coil on earth due to the curse of the Supreme Goddess, in the following memorable verse cited by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in his *Nyāya-mañjarī*, while discussing the utility of Grammar as a separate discipline, and as an ancillary to the Vedic lore :

41. *Vākyapadīya*, III. 13. 21. This definition of *śiṣṭa*-s is quite in accord with Patañjali's pronouncement in his *Bhāṣya* on P. VI. 3. 109 : *pṛṣodarādīni yathopadiṣṭam* – viz. *etasminnārya-nivāse ye brāhmaṇāḥ kumbhīdhānyāḥ alolupāḥ agṛhyamāṇakaraṇā kiñ cid antareṇa kasyās cid vidyāyāḥ pūragās tatra bhavantaḥ śiṣṭāḥ* / — Kielhorn's Edn., Vol. III, p. 174.

42. *Mahābhāṣya*, *Loc. cit.*, The term *śiṣṭa* has been employed by Bhartṛhari on numerous occasions to refer to the grammarians who are the acknowledged authorities on problems relating to speech. See *Vākyapadīya*, I. 27, 29; III. 13. 21; III. 14. 80.

bhraṣṭaḥ śāpena devyāḥ śivapura-vasateḥ
vandyahaṃ mandabhāgyaḥ
bhāvyaṃ vā janmanā me yadi
mala-kalile martyaloke saśoke |
mugdhābhir dugdhadhārāmala-madhura-
sudhābindu-niṣyandinībhiḥ
kāmaṃ jāyeya vaiyākaraṇabhaṇitibhis
tūrṇam āpūrṇa-karṇaḥ ||[43]

Thus, we might conclude our dissertation by quoting the highly cogent observations of the late Dr. Prabhat Chandra Chakravarti :

"No grammarian seems to have gone further than Bhartṛhari in harmonising grammatical speculations with the sublime teachings of Advaita philosophy."[44]

One might dispute Bhartṛhari's claim that Ultimate Reality is Logos or Eternal Verbum, but the realisation of a Yogin having a vision of the ultimate truth carries its own indisputable validity inspite of the apparent inconsistencies that might be discerned therein in the level of our discursive reasoning. As it has been beautifully set forth in the tollowing verse of the *Yoga-vāśiṣṭha* :

yogino viditātmāno bhāvayanti yathaiva tat |
tat tathaivāśu paśyanti dṛḍha-bhāvanayā tayā ||[45]

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43. *Nyāya-mañjarī*, Vol. I, p. 392. A similar benedictory verse glorifying *prātibha*–intuition reminiscent of the Grammarians' doctrine is worth mentioning here :

yasmin sammukhatāṃ prayāti ruciram ko 'py antar-ujjṛmbhate
nedīyān mahimā manasy abhinavaḥ puṃsaḥ prakāśātmanaḥ |
tṛptiṃ yat paramāṃ tanoti viṣayāsvādaṃ vinā śāśvatīṃ
dhāmānanda-sudhāmayorjita-vapus tat prātibhaṃ saṃstumaḥ ||

44. Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita's remarks in his *Śabda-kaustubha* with reference to Bhartṛhari's monistic conception of the Absolute in the form of Logos deserve our consideration in this context :

varāṭikānveṣaṇāya pravṛttaś cintāmaṇiṃ labdhavān iti Vāśiṣṭha-Rāmāyaṇoktābhāṇaka-nyāyena śabda-vicārāya pravṛttaḥ san prasaṅgād advaite brahmaṇy api vyutpadyatām – ity abhiprāyeṇa bhagavān Bhartṛharir vivartavādādikam api prasaṅgād vyudapādayat |

45. *Yoga-vāśiṣṭha* : *Nirvāṇa-prakaraṇa*, I. 82. 24.

Bhartṛhari's doctrine of *śabdādvaita-vāda*, thus, deserves serious consideration of modern philosophers of language, emphasising as it does the fundamentally spiritual character of speech lying at the basis of all our thought-processes and pragmatic activities.[46] As one of the modern Western scholars remarks :

> " In spite of the importance of language as the distinguishing feature of human consciousness and the medium through which all human knowledge passes, the study of linguistics and the philosophy of language in the West has only been seriously pursued in recent times. Today's modern scientific study suffers from focussing on the outer words especially in the written form. Even a cursory look at the long and fully developed Indian study of language strongly suggests that the nature of the language may be more complex and powerful than modern thought would lead us to suspect."[47]

46. We might quote here Walt Whitman's words : " All words are spiritual, nothing is more spiritual than words ". — cited by Ogdian and Richards in *Meaning of Meaning*, p. 24, (London, 1956).

47. Howard G. Coward : *The Spoṭa Theory of Language : A Philosophical Analysis*, p. 15 (Motilal Banarsidass, 1st Ed., Delhi, 1980). Compare also : " The Philosophical Analysis of Language is not just a logical exercise, to satisfy intellectual curiosity, but an earnest and sustained spiritual approach to identify oneself with the Basic Ground of Word Phenomena, with *Śabda-brahman*. Bhartṛhari elaborates this approach as *Śabda-yoga* or *Śabda-pūrvaka-yoga*, and in this sense Grammar is a Straight Pathway to Freedom (*mokṣamāṇānām ajihmā rāja-paddhatiḥ*). " — Prof. T. R. V. Murti, Foreword, *Op. cit.*, p. xiv. We might refer in this connection to Sister Nivedita's *The Master as I saw him*, Chap. XV ('On Hinduism') pp. 145–46, for the theory of creation of the universe out of ideas and its comparison with Plato's philosophy as interpreted by Swami Vivekananda in *The Complete works of Sister Nivedita*, Vol. I (Birth Centenary Publication, Sister Nivedita Girls' School, Calcutta, Second Edition, March 1972). Compare also : This is the thought-background of Yama's eulogy of *Om* as the symbol of Ātman in verses 15–17 of the Second Chapter of the *Kaṭha-Upaniṣad*. The eulogy is meant for both *Om* and Ātman, since we have seen that what fits one fits also the other. Explaining the significance of *Om* as the highest symbol of God, Swami Vivekananda says :

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" All this expressed sensible universe is the form, behind which stands the eternal inexpressible *Sphoṭa*, the manifester as Logos or Word. The eternal *Sphoṭa*, the essential eternal material of all ideas or names, is the power through which the Lord creates the Universe. Nay, the Lord first becomes combined with *Sphoṭa*, and then evolves Himself out as the yet more concrete sensible universe. This *Sphoṭa* has one word as its only possible symbol, and this is the *Om*. And as by no possible means of analysis can we separate the word from the idea, this *Om* and the eternal *Sphoṭa* are inseparable; and therefore, it is out of this holiest of all holy words, the mother of all names and forms, the eternal *Om*, that the whole universe may be supposed to have been created .. The *Sphoṭa* is the material of all words, yet it is not any definite word in its fully formed state. That is to say, if all peculiarities which distinguish one word from another be removed then what remains will be the *Sphoṭa*; therefore this *Sphoṭa* is called *nāda-brahman*, the Sound-Brahman...

" If properly pronounced, this *Om* will represent the whole phenomena of sound-production, and no other word can do this; and this, therefore, is the fittest symbol of the *Sphoṭa*, which is the real meaning of *Om*. And as the symbol can never be separated from the thing signified, the *Om* and the *Sphoṭa* are one. And as the *Sphoṭa*, being the finer side of the manifested universe, is nearer to God, and is indeed the first manifestation of divine wisdom, this *Om* is truly symbolic of God. " —Swami Vivekānanda : Complete Works, Vol. III, 8th Edn., pp. 57–58 (*Bhakti-Yoga*).

The contribution of the Hindu Grammarians in the field of philosophy of language has been highly eulogised by the doyen of modern linguistics, Roman Jakobson, the Central figure of the Prague School, in the following extract :

" It would certainly be wrong to ignore the brilliant insights concerning the role of sounds in language, which can be found scattered through the works of thinkers of Antiquity and of the Middle Ages, for example those of Thomas Acquinas, who was among the most profound of philosophers of language : and it would equally be wrong to ignore the subtle observations of the Ancient Oriental, and above all, Hindu, grammarians. " — *Six Lectures on Sound and Meaning* (translated from the French with a Preface by C. Lévi-Strauss, The Harvester Press Ltd., 1978, 2 Stanford Terrace, Hassocks, Sussex, Great Britain), p. 4.